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We examine the motivational implications for operational and financial transactions in hostile 
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types of bid resistance, our findings suggest that this action is motivated less by target 
undervaluation and the potential for price improvements from initial offers, and more by the 
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likely to have triggered the action as a ploy for their own ends than for the advantage of target 
stockholders. 
 
 
JEL classification: G34 
 
Keywords: hostile takeover; bid resistance; stockholder wealth; managerial turnover 
 
 
January 7, 2018  
 
                                                          
a Department of Finance, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TY, 
UK. Corresponding author. Phone: +44 (0)121-41-46704. Email: n.carline@bham.ac.uk. 
b Division of Finance, Michael F. Price College of Business, University of Oklahoma, Norman OK73019, 
US. 
c For detailed feedback, we thank the following individuals: Eric de Bodt; Mark Chen; Andrey Golubov; 
Dirk Jenter; Omesh Kini; Hamed Mahmudi; David Mauer; William Megginson; Thomas Moeller; Michael 
Rebello; Gregory Waller. We also thank participants at Annual Meetings of the American Finance 
Association and Financial Management Association, as well as attendees at seminars and workshops held 
at the following places: City, University of London (Cass); Georgia State University (Robinson); Lancaster 
University (LUMS); University of Auckland; University of Lille (SKEMA); University of Oklahoma 
(Price); University of Texas at Dallas (Jindal). Lastly, we are grateful to the Economic and Social Research 
Council for financial support. 
1 
 
Do More Extreme Actions By Incumbent CEOs To Resist Hostile 
Takeover Bids Have Legitimacy For Target Stockholders? 
1. Introduction 
 With hostile takeover bids on the rise once more there is much at stake for target 
stockholders and CEOs alike.1 For target stockholders there is the expectation of positive 
wealth effects, while for incumbent CEOs there is the expectation of managerial turnover. 
Hostility in takeover bids can be a double-edged sword for target stockholders. Although 
hostility may be motivated by target undervaluation and the potential for price improvements 
from initial offers, it may also be motivated by the potential for incumbent CEO 
entrenchment. The task that investors then face is to decide whether incumbent CEOs are 
more likely to have triggered hostility, by rejecting initial offers, as a ploy for their own ends 
than for the advantage of target stockholders. In this study, we examine whether this task is a 
different proposition for target stockholders when incumbent CEOs also trigger more extreme 
actions to resist hostile takeover bids. 
 We define more extreme actions to resist hostile takeover bids (hereafter, frustrating 
action) as being the triggering by incumbent CEOs of any operational and financial 
transaction that make targets less valuable and more difficult to acquire, at least for initial 
would-be acquirers. Frustrating action includes defensive divestments, acquisitions, and 
payouts. When triggered (announced), many forms of frustrating action are value reducing 
for target stockholders (see Ruback, 1987). Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), however, caution 
against reliance on announcement effects to pass judgement on frustrating action. In contrast 
to the theoretical analysis of Baron (1983), but in theoretical consensus with Hirshleifer and 
Titman (1990), Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) predict that even frustrating action can be for 
the advantage of target stockholders. Although frustrating action can be value reducing for 
initial would-be acquirers, it does not necessarily also make targets less valuable and more 
                                                          
1 See Hostile takeovers rise to 14-year high in M&A as confidence grows, Financial Times, June 8, 2014.      
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difficult to acquire for other would-be acquirers. Moreover, the threat to trigger frustrating 
action can be sufficient to generate higher offer premiums from initial would-be acquirers. 
Frustrating action may therefore be motivated by target undervaluation and by the potential 
for price improvements from initial offers. However, Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) also 
predict that more incumbent managerial control can make target stockholders less easily 
persuaded that frustrating action is in their best interests, and not motivated more by the 
potential for incumbent managerial entrenchment.  
Our empirical objectives are twofold. First, we examine the relative importance of 
initial offer and target characteristics for predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids 
to shed light on the motivational implications for this type of resistance. Second, we examine 
whether the motivational implications for frustrating action are reflected in the target 
stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids and in the rate of incumbent CEO turnover 
after hostile takeover bids. 
 The main concern for a study of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids is the pre-
existence of legal provisions or mechanisms in corporate charters and States of incorporation 
that have been shown to give firms protection from takeover bids (see Cuñat, Giné, and 
Guadalupe, 2017; Cain, McKeon, and Solomon, 2017; Karpoff, Schonlau, and Wehrly, 2017). 
Cain, McKeon, and Solomon (2017) also present empirical results showing that targets with 
more takeover protection from these structural defenses generate higher offer premiums.2 
Although we can account for the effect of censoring non-targets, for targets, because of the 
pre-existence of structural defenses, it is possible that not all bid resistance will be observed. 
There therefore remains the concern of incompletely differentiating between frustrating 
action and other types of resistance in hostile takeover bids. In contrast to the situation in the 
                                                          
2 Cuñat, Giné, and Guadalupe (2017), however, also show empirically that targets with less takeover 
protection from structural defenses generate higher offer premiums.  
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US, company laws have consistently rendered structural defenses absent in the UK. For these 
reasons, we examine frustrating action in UK hostile takeover bids.    
 Our findings shed new light on the motivational implications for hostility in takeover 
bids. Franks and Mayer (1996), Schwert (2000), and Bates and Becher (2017) present 
empirical analysis suggesting that incumbent managers are more likely to have triggered 
hostility for the advantage of target stockholders than as a ploy for their own ends. However, 
we find that the relationships between initial offer and target characteristics and the 
probability of general hostility in takeover bids have clearer motivational implications when 
it comes to also differentiating between frustrating action and other types of resistance in 
hostile takeover bids. In particular, although our findings provide support for the suggestion 
that general hostility is motivated by the potential for price improvements from initial offers 
(see Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993; Bates and Becher, 2017), this motive would seem to have 
less to do with frustrating action than other types of bid resistance. Also, although we find 
support for the suggestion that general hostility is also motivated by incumbent CEO 
inefficiency and, hence, the potential for entrenchment (see Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1988), this motive would seem to have more to do with frustrating action than other types of 
bid resistance. 
 The takeover literature also emphasizes the importance of incumbent managerial 
control to an understanding of various outcomes in takeover bids (see Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Stulz, 1988; Mikkelson and Partch, 1989; Shivdasani, 1993; Cotter and Zenner, 1994; 
Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997; Moeller, 2005; Jenter 
and Lewellen, 2015). In a new context, we find that proxies for more incumbent CEO control 
gain importance for predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. In particular, hostile 
takeover bids with frustrating action are associated more with middle-aged incumbent CEOs 
and with larger incumbent CEO stockholdings, but smaller other incumbent directors 
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stockholdings, than other hostile takeover bids. Hostile takeover bids with frustrating action 
are also associated less with independent incumbent chairpersons and with smaller target 
outside blockholdings than other hostile takeover bids. All in all, our findings for incumbent 
CEO control suggest that frustrating action is motivated more by the potential for 
entrenchment than other types of bid resistance. 
Differentiating between frustrating action and other types of resistance also gives new 
insights into the takeover literature on the target stockholder wealth effects of hostility in 
takeover bids (see Huang and Walkling, 1987; Schwert, 2000), on incumbent managerial 
turnover after hostility in takeover bids (see Martin and McConnell, 1991; Agrawal and 
Walkling, 1994; Harford, 2003; Kini, Kracaw, and Mian, 2004), and on incumbent 
managerial turnover after failed takeover bids (see Denis and Serrano, 1996; Bates and 
Becher, 2017). We go on to find that the motivational implications for frustrating action are 
reflected in smaller target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids, and in a higher 
rate of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids, than for other types of resistance. 
The first of these findings is indicative of investor realization that incumbent CEOs are more 
likely to have triggered frustrating action as a ploy for their own ends than for the advantage 
of target stockholders, while the second finding suggests that hostile takeover bids with 
frustrating action are more likely to be disciplinary than other hostile takeover bids. Although 
incumbent CEOs that trigger frustrating action are more likely to survive after failed hostile 
takeover bids, we also find that failed hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are 
associated more with incumbent CEO turnover than other failed hostile takeover bids. This 
finding is indicative of surviving incumbent boards and investors acting on the realization 
that incumbent CEOs are more likely to have triggered frustrating action as a ploy for their 
own ends than for the advantage of target stockholders.  
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 Our findings are also new to the takeover literature on frustrating action in hostile 
takeover bids (see Dann and DeAngelo, 1988; Klein and Rosenfeld, 1988; Denis, 1990; 
Heron and Lie, 2006; Ryngaert and Scholten, 2010). In contrast to these studies, we examine 
frustrating action non-selectively and relative to a control group for other types of bid 
resistance. Lastly, our findings complement the analysis of Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2014) 
showing that a theoretical measure for the extent of bid resistance is greater for targets with 
more managerial control. We do not find similar support, however, for the extent of bid 
resistance being greater for takeover bids with multiple would-be acquirers.           
We account for the effects of censoring other takeover bids and treating the type of 
bid resistance as being exogenous. For these tests, we differentiate between target fiscal year-
ends before and after incorporation of the corporate governance recommendations of the 
Cadbury Report into the listing requirements of the main London market in 1993. The post-
Cadbury environment makes it mandatory for incumbent boards to state the extent of their 
compliance with recommendations intended to lessen CEO control and is associated with a 
wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control (see Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Dahya, 
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2016). We find that a post-Cadbury variable is an important 
predictor of general hostility in takeover bids and of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. 
However, we have no a-priori reason to suspect that a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO 
control is also directly relevant when it comes to differences in the target stockholder wealth 
effects of hostile takeover bids and in the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile 
takeover bids. Besides serving as a reliably strong exclusive variable, the theoretical analysis 
of Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) suggests that an exogenous event potentially affecting the 
ability of incumbent managers to trigger frustrating action can make for a more powerful 
study. For these reasons, we examine frustrating action in hostile takeover bids before and 
after the Cadbury Report in the years 1989-2003. 
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 The study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample of hostile takeover 
bids. Section 3 examines the relative importance of initial offer and target characteristics for 
predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids to shed light on the motivational 
implications for this type of resistance. Sections 4 and 5 examine whether the motivational 
implications for frustrating action are reflected in the target stockholder wealth effects of 
hostile takeover bids and in the rate of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids, 
respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes.     
2. Sample of hostile takeover bids  
 In this section, we describe the sample of hostile takeover bids. We present and 
discuss descriptive statistics for sample time series in Section 2.1, and do the same in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 for bid and target characteristics and frustrating action in hostile 
takeover bids, respectively. 
2.1 Sample 
 To construct the sample of hostile takeover bids, we start with takeover offers in the 
Securities Data Corporation database for UK public firms that are announced between July 1, 
1989 and December 31, 2003. We use the Corporate Register, first published in March 1989 
and thereafter in six month intervals, to exclude takeover offers for targets that are not listed 
on the main London market and that belong to one of the following more regulated 
industries: financials; utilities; telecommunications; broadcasting; newspapers; public 
transport. 
 Initial offers are announced at least one year after prior takeover bids and are for at 
least fifty percent of the target stock. Takeover bids begin from rumors and extend to 
improved offers from initial and other would-be acquirers announced within one year of prior 
takeover offers. We carry out these screening and merging procedures for takeover offers 
using the Regulatory News Service (RNS). Merging takeover offers in this way ensures that 
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we consistently measure the actual target stockholder wealth effects of failed hostile takeover 
bids, and that we consistently capture incumbent CEO turnover after failed hostile takeover 
bids, in the absence of takeover offers for at least one year. Hostile takeover bids have RNS 
announcements in which incumbent CEOs reject initial offers. We censor other takeover bids, 
but account for the effect of doing so in the modelling parts of the empirical analysis. 
In Panel A of Table 1, we present sample time series, by bid (initial offer) 
announcement years, for the frequencies of all takeover bids and hostile takeover bids. Of the 
792 takeover bids in total, 130 (16.41 percent) are hostile takeover bids. There is a noticeable 
sustained drop, however, in the proportions for hostile takeover bids after incorporation of the 
Cadbury recommendations into the listing requirements of the main London market in 1993. 
Given that the post-Cadbury environment is associated with a wholesale lessening of 
incumbent CEO control, this observation suggests that general hostility is motivated to at 
least some extent by incumbent CEO control.  
Also, in Panel B of Table 1, we present sample time series, by bid announcement 
years, for the aggregate sizes of targets (in real, 2003, GBP million) for all takeover bids and 
hostile takeover bids.3 Of the GBP 392,711.67 million aggregate size of targets in total, GBP 
124,324.80 million (31.66 percent) is for hostile takeover bids. Hostile takeover bids are 
therefore associated with larger targets than other takeover bids. Also, there is no sustained 
drop in the proportions for the aggregate sizes of targets for hostile takeover bids in the post-
Cadbury environment, which suggests that larger targets are unlikely to be a strong proxy for 
more incumbent CEO control. 
2.2 Bid and target characteristics         
 In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics for the bid and target characteristics of 
hostile takeover bids. We define bid and target characteristics in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
                                                          
3 We define target size in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
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For the dependent variables, we measure the expected target stockholder wealth 
effects of hostile takeover bids from before rumors through to initial offer announcements, 
whereas the measurement periods for the actual target stockholder wealth effects span the 
entire durations of hostile takeover bids, and one year after for failed hostile takeover bids. 
The expected and actual target stockholder wealth effects average 23.48 and 24.47 percent, 
respectively. For the actual target stockholder wealth effects, however, the standard deviation 
is almost twice as large as for the expected target stockholder wealth effects. Also for the 
dependent variables, incumbent CEO turnover is instigated after hostile takeover bids by 
successful acquirers and by surviving incumbent boards and investors within one year of, and, 
thus, within relatively close proximity to, failed hostile takeover bids. The rate of incumbent 
CEO turnover is 44.63 percent. 
 As for the independent variables for bid characteristics, the takeover literature 
suggests accounting for multiple would-be acquirers (see Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993), failed 
takeover bids (see Denis and Serrano, 1996), initial offer premiums (see Jennings and 
Mazzeo, 1993; Bates and Becher, 2017), and initial cash-only offers (see Malmendier, Opp, 
and Saidi, 2016). Multiple would-be acquirers occur in 19.23 percent of hostile takeover bids 
and failed takeover bids account for 31.54 percent of hostile takeover bids. Also, initial offer 
premiums average 33.49 percent for hostile takeover bids and initial cash-only offers occur in 
67.69 percent of hostile takeover bids. Interestingly, although we also measure initial offer 
premiums from before bid rumors, the mean and standard deviation for the expected target 
stockholder wealth effects are noticeably lower than for initial offer premiums, and, as it 
turns out, by percentage differences that are roughly equal to the rate of failed hostile 
takeover bids. 
 The takeover literature also suggests independent variables that proxy for target 
information asymmetry (see Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993). For our proxies for target 
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information asymmetry, newly-listed targets occur in 16.28 percent of hostile takeover bids 
and target stock volatility and target financial slack average 2.20 and 10.54 percent, 
respectively, for hostile takeover bids. Also, target size and target leverage average GBP 
986.70 million (in real, 2003, terms) and 55.44 percent, respectively, for hostile takeover bids. 
We convert target size into natural logarithmic form in the modelling parts of the empirical 
analysis. 
 Lastly, we include variables that proxy for incumbent CEO inefficiency and control. 
For our proxies for incumbent CEO inefficiency, target asset-turnover ratios average 138.61 
percent for hostile takeover bids. Also, target stock performance and target market-to-book 
ratios average -32.47 and 131.85 percent, respectively, for hostile takeover bids.  
For our proxies for incumbent CEO control, incumbent CEO age averages 51.57 years 
for hostile takeover bids. Also, incumbent CEO stockholdings and other incumbent directors 
stockholdings average 2.72 percent and 2.21 (aggregate) percent, respectively, for hostile 
takeover bids. We alternate between linear, curvilinear, and natural logarithmic forms for 
incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors 
stockholding in the modelling parts of the empirical analysis. Also, independent incumbent 
chairpersons occur in 34.71 percent of hostile takeover bids, incumbent board size averages 
7.13 directors for hostile takeover bids, initial would-be acquirers with interlocking/siding 
incumbent directors occur in 12.31 percent of hostile takeover bids, and target outside 
blockholdings average 29.26 (aggregate) percent for hostile takeover bids. Although the post-
Cadbury environment is associated with a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control, 
none of our proxies for incumbent CEO control equate to specific Cadbury recommendations. 
In particular, one of the recommendations is for incumbent CEOs and chairpersons to be 
separate directors, but not specifically for incumbent chairpersons to be independent directors. 
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Also, the recommendations do not specifically require that independent directors be seated on 
at least one other board. 
We measure and capture the variables for target characteristics before rumors to 
ensure that the proxies for information asymmetry and CEO inefficiency and control are 
consistently in the absence of hostile takeover bids. Also, the modelling parts of the empirical 
analysis are, for all intents and purposes, unaffected if we windsorize the dependent and 
independent variables. 
2.3 Frustrating action                
 In Table 3, we present frequencies for the triggering of frustrating action by 
incumbent CEOs in hostile takeover bids. We use the RNS to differentiate between 
frustrating action and other types of bid resistance. Unlike frustrating action, other types of 
bid resistance do not amount to any operational and financial transactions that make targets 
less valuable and more difficult to acquire. These less extreme types of bid resistance amount 
in the main to stakeholder communication and delaying tactics. Litigation, however, as an 
example of a delaying tactic (see Jarrell, 1985), rarely occurs in UK hostile takeover bids. 
Also, other would-be acquirers, friendly (white knight) or otherwise, cut across hostile 
takeover bids with frustrating action and other hostile takeover bids. Of the 130 hostile 
takeover bids in total, 53 (40.77 percent) are hostile takeover bids with any form of 
frustrating action. We account for the effect of treating the type of bid resistance as being 
exogenous in the modelling parts of the empirical analysis.   
Incumbent CEOs, however, trigger several, and sometimes multiple, forms of 
frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. By far, the most common form of frustrating action 
is the demerging and selling of target, crown-jewel, assets (defensive divestment), which 
occurs in 20.00 percent of hostile takeover bids. Making counter, pac-man, takeover offers, 
buying other firms or assets, and creating joint ventures (defensive acquisition) is the next 
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most common form of frustrating action, occurring in 13.08 percent of hostile takeover bids. 
A far less common form of frustrating action is the repurchasing of the target stock and the 
paying of special dividends (defensive payout), which occurs in 6.15 percent of hostile 
takeover bids. Introducing special compensation payments in the event of incumbent CEO 
turnover after hostile takeover bids (golden parachute) and taking targets private (defensive 
management buyout) are jointly the next least common forms of frustrating action, occurring 
in 3.85 percent of hostile takeover bids. Lastly, the least common form of frustrating action is 
the facilitating of alliances by acquisitions of target toeholds below the thirty percent 
threshold for mandatory takeover offers (white squire), which occurs in 3.08 percent of 
hostile takeover bids. 
3. Predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids 
 In this section, we examine the relative importance of initial offer and target 
characteristics for predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids to shed light on the 
motivational implications for this type of resistance. We present and discuss results from 
basic likelihood models in Section 3.1, and do the same in Section 3.2 for a likelihood model 
that accounts for the effect of censoring other takeover bids. The dependent variable for all 
models equals one for hostile takeover bids with frustrating action and zero for other hostile 
takeover bids. To proxy for a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control, all models also 
include a post-Cadbury variable that equals one for target fiscal year-ends after June 30, 1993 
in the RNS before bid rumors and zero for other target fiscal year-ends. Also, all models 
include controls for four target industries and are, for all intents and purposes, unaffected by 
the inclusion or otherwise of controls for bid announcement years.4 
3.1 Basic likelihood models 
                                                          
4 We use the Corporate Register to combine target, ICB, industries into four groups as follows: (i) oil & 
gas and basic materials; (ii) industrials, including technology hardware & equipment; (iii) consumer goods 
and healthcare; (iv) consumer services, including software & computers services. 
12 
 
 In Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4, we present average marginal effects from probit 
regressions for the probability of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. We model the 
probability of frustrating action as a linear, curvilinear, and natural logarithmic function of 
incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors 
stockholding in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The results in Column (4), upon which we 
base the discussion, blend the strongest of these functions. 
For initial offer characteristics, the results show that hostile takeover bids with 
frustrating action are associated with higher initial offer premiums than other hostile takeover 
bids. A one standard deviation (37.28 percentage-points) increase in the initial offer premium 
is associated with a 16.58 percentage-points increase in the probability of frustrating action. 
This average marginal effect is significant at the one percent level and suggests that 
frustrating action is motivated less by the potential for price improvements from initial offers 
than other types of bid resistance, no matter whether initial would-be acquirers offer higher 
premiums in an attempt to kill-off threats from incumbent CEOs to trigger frustrating action, 
as the theoretical analysis of Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) predicts. Malmendier, Opp, and 
Saidi (2016) present empirical results suggesting that cash offers signal undervaluation of the 
target stock. Our results reveal that hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are also 
associated less with initial cash-only offers than other hostile takeover bids. An initial cash-
only offer is associated with a 16.46 percentage-points decrease in the probability of 
frustrating action relative to other initial offers. This average marginal effect is significant at 
the five percent level and suggests that frustrating action is motivated less by target 
undervaluation and, hence, the potential for price improvements from initial offers than other 
types of bid resistance.  
A similar inference can be drawn from the results for target characteristics that proxy 
for information asymmetry and, hence, the potential for undervaluation. These results show 
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that hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are associated less with newly-listed targets, 
and, thus, less with target information asymmetry, than other hostile takeover bids. A newly-
listed target is associated with a 44.84 percentage-points decrease in the probability of 
frustrating action relative to other targets. This average marginal effect is significant at the 
one percent level. The results also reveal that hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are 
associated with lower target stock volatility, and, thus, with less target information 
asymmetry, than other hostile takeover bids. A one standard deviation (1.37 percentage-
points) increase in the target’s stock volatility is associated with a 10.57 percentage-points 
decrease in the probability of frustrating action. This average marginal effect is significant at 
the ten percent level. The results also show that hostile takeover bids with frustrating action 
are associated with lower target financial slack, and, thus, with less target information 
asymmetry, than other hostile takeover bids. A one standard deviation (15.27 percentage-
points) increase in the target’s financial slack is associated with a 10.42 percentage-points 
decrease in the probability of frustrating action. This average marginal effect is significant at 
the five percent level. Hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are not, however, 
associated with significantly different target size and target leverage from other hostile 
takeover bids.5 The first three of these results suggest that frustrating action is motivated less 
by target information asymmetry and, hence, the potential for undervaluation than other types 
of bid resistance.                                              
Target characteristics that proxy for CEO inefficiency and control also gain 
importance for predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. For incumbent CEO 
inefficiency, the results show that hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are associated 
with lower target asset-turnover ratios, and, thus, with more incumbent CEO inefficiency, 
                                                          
5 Although target size and incumbent board size are highly correlated, the average marginal effects for 
target size remain insignificant if we drop incumbent board size from all models. Also, the estimates for 
initial offer and target characteristics are, for all intents and purposes, unaffected if we drop target size 
from all models.  
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than other hostile takeover bids. A one standard deviation (89.20 percentage-points) increase 
in the target’s asset-turnover ratio is associated with a 19.93 percentage-points decrease in the 
probability of frustrating action. This average marginal effect is significant at the one percent 
level. Hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are not, however, associated with 
significantly different target stock performance and target market-to-book ratios from other 
hostile takeover bids. The first of these results suggests that frustrating action is motivated 
more by incumbent CEO inefficiency and, hence, the potential for entrenchment than other 
types of bid resistance.   
For incumbent CEO control, the results show that hostile takeover bids with 
frustrating action are associated more with middle-aged incumbent CEOs, and, thus, more 
with control preference incumbent CEOs, than other hostile takeover bids. The probability of 
frustrating action is strictly a curvilinear function of incumbent CEO age, as is fully revealed 
by the supplementary results that we present in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 and discuss 
now. In Column (1), the probability of frustrating action for a 66 year-old, maximum-aged, 
incumbent CEO (24.49 percent), while higher than for a 38 year-old, minimum-aged, 
incumbent CEO (11.29 percent), is less than half the probability of frustrating action for a 52 
year-old, mean-aged, incumbent CEO (50.83 percent). Also, in Column (2), the incremental 
probabilities of frustrating action increase significantly for incumbent CEO ages 38-52, 
change insignificantly for incumbent CEO ages 52-60, and decrease significantly for 
incumbent CEO ages 60-66. 
The results for CEO control also show that the probability of frustrating action is 
strictly a monotonic function of incumbent CEO stockholding and that hostile takeover bids 
with frustrating action are associated with larger incumbent CEO stockholdings, and, thus, 
with more incumbent CEO control, than other hostile takeover bids. A one standard deviation 
(7.26 percentage-points) increase in the incumbent CEO’s stockholding is associated with a 
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28.10 percentage-points increase in the probability of frustrating action. This average 
marginal effect is significant at the one percent level. In contrast, although the probability of 
frustrating action is also strictly a monotonic function of other incumbent directors 
stockholding, hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are also associated with smaller 
other incumbent directors stockholdings, and, thus, with more incumbent CEO control, than 
other hostile takeover bids. A one standard deviation (6.51 percentage-points) increase in the 
other incumbent directors’ stockholding is associated with a 46.87 percentage-points decrease 
in the probability of frustrating action. This average marginal effect is significant at the one 
percent level. 
Also for incumbent CEO control, the results show that hostile takeover bids with 
frustrating action are also associated less with independent incumbent chairpersons, and, thus, 
more with incumbent CEO control, than other hostile takeover bids. An independent 
incumbent chairperson is associated with a 16.65 percentage-points decrease in the 
probability of frustrating action relative to other incumbent chairpersons. This average 
marginal effect is significant at the five percent level. The results also reveal that hostile 
takeover bids with frustrating action are associated with smaller incumbent boards, and, thus, 
with more incumbent CEO control, than other hostile takeover bids. A one standard deviation 
(2.35 directors) increase in the incumbent board’s size is associated with an 11.89 
percentage-points decrease in the probability of frustrating action. This average marginal 
effect is significant at the five percent level. The results also show that hostile takeover bids 
with frustrating action are associated less with initial would-be acquirers with 
interlocking/siding incumbent directors, and, thus, more with incumbent CEO control, than 
other hostile takeover bids. An initial would-be acquirer with an interlocking/siding 
incumbent director is associated with a 32.07 percentage-points decrease in the probability of 
frustrating action relative to other initial would-be acquirers. This average marginal effect is 
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significant at the one percent level. The results also reveal that hostile takeover bids with 
frustrating action are associated with smaller target outside blockholdings, and, thus, with 
more incumbent CEO control, than other hostile takeover bids. A one standard deviation 
(20.00 percentage-points) increase in the target’s outside blockholdings is associated with a 
22.20 percentage-points decrease in the probability of frustrating action. This average 
marginal effect is significant at the one percent level. All in all, the results for incumbent 
CEO control suggest that frustrating action is motivated more by the potential for 
entrenchment than other types of bid resistance.                                 
Lastly, the post-Cadbury variable, which proxies for a wholesale lessening of 
incumbent CEO control, also gains importance for predicting frustrating action in hostile 
takeover bids. Interestingly, hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are associated more 
with post-Cadbury target fiscal year-ends, and, thus, more with a wholesale lessening of 
incumbent CEO control, than other hostile takeover bids. A post-Cadbury target fiscal year-
end is associated with a 55.68 percentage-points increase in the probability of frustrating 
action relative to other target fiscal year-ends. This average marginal effect is significant at 
the one percent level and suggests that, in the post-Cadbury environment, incumbent CEOs 
perceive target stockholders as being more easily persuaded, genuinely or otherwise, that 
frustrating action is in their best interests, and not motivated more by the potential for 
incumbent CEO entrenchment than other types of bid resistance. Such an interpretation is 
broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions of Berkovitch and Khanna (1990). Our 
prior results suggest, however, that this general perception grows with more incumbent CEO 
control. We are therefore led to believe that the post-Cadbury environment is more of a cover 
for incumbent CEOs to trigger frustrating action for their own ends than an instigator for 
them to trigger it for the advantage of target stockholders. 
3.2 Effect of censoring other takeover bids                          
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 The relative importance of initial offer and target characteristics for predicting 
frustrating action in hostile takeover bids can be incorrectly estimated without accounting for 
the effect of censoring other takeover bids. This is because initial offer and target 
characteristics can be correlated with unobservable factors, such as the potential for 
incumbent CEO entrenchment and private information about the potential for target 
undervaluation, that jointly predict frustrating action in hostile takeover bids and general 
hostility in takeover bids. Of particular concern for our basic likelihood models is the 
possibility that incumbent CEOs threaten to trigger frustrating action during private 
negotiations leading to friendly takeover bids. 
To address and discuss the relevance of these issues, in Column (1) of Table 6, we 
present average marginal effects from a probit regression, with sample selection, for the 
probability of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. This probit regression is equivalent 
to the basic likelihood model upon which we base the discussion of Section 3.1. In Column 
(2) of Table 6, we present average marginal effects from a sample selection regression for the 
probability of general hostility in takeover bids. The dependent variable for this sample 
selection regression equals one for hostile takeover bids and zero for other takeover bids. 
Because of manual data collection limitations for the variables that proxy for incumbent CEO 
control, the sample selection regression includes, equivalent, initial offer and target 
characteristics through to target leverage in the probit regression. However, as for the probit 
regression, the sample selection regression includes the post-Cadbury variable to proxy for a 
wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control. To differentiate the sample selection 
regression from the probit regression, we include in the sample selection regression, and 
exclude from the probit regression, variables for bid rumors and mandatory initial offers. The 
first of these variables equals one for takeover bids with bid rumors in the RNS and zero for 
other takeover bids, and the second variable equals one for takeover bids with mandatory 
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initial offers in the RNS, when initial would-be acquirers raise their target toeholds to at least 
thirty percent, and zero for other takeover bids. It is our expectation that these variables are 
important, positive, predictors of general hostility in takeover bids because bid rumors are 
normally an indication that approaches by initial would-be acquirers have failed to result in 
friendly takeover bids, and because mandatory initial offers are generally associated with 
unsolicited takeover bids. However, we have no a-priori reason to suspect that these variables 
are also relevant when it comes to differentiating between frustrating action and other types 
of resistance in hostile takeover bids.  
A test for the effect of censoring other takeover bids is insignificant. This test result 
suggests that we can examine the relative importance of initial offer and target characteristics 
for predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids independently of doing the same for 
general hostility in takeover bids. We have all the more reason for doing so given that initial 
offer and target characteristics are insignificantly correlated with unobservable factors that, 
insignificantly, jointly predict frustrating action in hostile takeover bids and general hostility 
in takeover bids. That is, given that the estimates for initial offer and target characteristics for 
the basic likelihood model are, for all intents and purposes, unaffected after accounting for 
the effect of censoring other takeover bids.  
The probit and sample selection regressions, however, reveal that the relationships 
between initial offer and target characteristics and the probability of general hostility in 
takeover bids have clearer motivational implications when it comes to also differentiating 
between frustrating action and other types of resistance in hostile takeover bids. For initial 
offer characteristics, the results show that hostile takeover bids are associated with lower 
initial offer premiums than other takeover bids. The average marginal effect for the initial 
offer premium on the probability of general hostility is significant at the five percent level. 
Although this relationship provides support for the suggestion that general hostility is 
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motivated by the potential for price improvements from initial offers (see Jennings and 
Mazzeo, 1993; Bates and Becher, 2017), this motive would seem to have less to do with 
frustrating action than other types of bid resistance. The results also reveal that hostile 
takeover bids are associated more with initial cash-only offers than other takeover bids, 
possibly because cash offers signal target undervaluation. The average marginal effect for an 
initial cash-only offer, relative to other initial offers, on the probability of general hostility is 
significant at the one percent level. Although this relationship suggests that general hostility 
is motivated by target undervaluation and, hence, the potential for price improvements from 
initial offers, this motive would seem to have less to do with frustrating action than other 
types of bid resistance. 
 For target characteristics that proxy for information asymmetry and, hence, the 
potential for undervaluation, the results show that hostile takeover bids are associated less 
with newly-listed targets, and, thus, less with target information asymmetry, than other 
takeover bids. The average marginal effect for a newly-listed target, relative to other targets, 
on the probability of general hostility is significant at the five percent level. Also, the results 
reveal that hostile takeover bids are associated with lower target stock volatility, and, thus, 
with less target information asymmetry, than other takeover bids. The average marginal effect 
for the target’s stock volatility on the probability of general hostility is significant at the one 
percent level. Also, the results show that hostile takeover bids are associated with larger 
targets, and, thus, with less target information asymmetry, than other takeover bids. The 
average marginal effect for the target’s size on the probability of general hostility is 
significant at the one percent level. In contrast, hostile takeover bids are also associated with 
lower target leverage than other takeover bids. The average marginal effect for the target’s 
leverage on the probability of general hostility is significant at the one percent level. Hostile 
takeover bids are not, however, associated with significantly different target financial slack 
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from other takeover bids. Although the first three of these relationships provide support for 
the suggestion that general hostility is not motivated by target information asymmetry and, 
hence, the potential for undervaluation (see Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993), this motive would 
seem to have less to do with frustrating action than other types of bid resistance.  
 The relationships between target characteristics that proxy for CEO inefficiency and 
the probability of general hostility in takeover bids also have clearer motivational 
implications when it comes to differentiating between frustrating action and other types of 
resistance in hostile takeover bids. These results show that hostile takeover bids are 
associated with worse target stock performance, and, thus, with more incumbent CEO 
inefficiency, than other takeover bids. The average marginal effect for the target’s stock 
performance on the probability of general hostility is significant at the one percent level. Also, 
the results reveal that hostile takeover bids are associated with lower target market-to-book 
ratios, and, thus, with more incumbent CEO inefficiency, than other takeover bids. The 
average marginal effect for the target’s market-to-book ratio on the probability of general 
hostility is significant at the five percent level. Hostile takeover bids are not, however, 
associated with significantly different target asset-turnover ratios from other takeover bids. 
Although the first two of these relationships provide support for the suggestion that general 
hostility is also motivated by incumbent CEO inefficiency and, hence, the potential for 
entrenchment (see Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988), this motive would seem to have more 
to do with frustrating action than other types of bid resistance. 
 Lastly, the relationship between the post-Cadbury variable and the probability of 
general hostility in takeover bids also has clearer motivational implications when it comes to 
differentiating between frustrating action and other types of resistance in hostile takeover bids. 
Hostile takeover bids are associated less with post-Cadbury target fiscal year-ends, and, thus, 
less with a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control, than other takeover bids. The 
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average marginal effect for a post-Cadbury target fiscal year-end, relative to other target 
fiscal year-ends, on the probability of general hostility is significant at the one percent level. 
Although this relationship suggests that general hostility is also motivated by incumbent CEO 
control and, hence, the potential for entrenchment, this motive would seem to have more to 
do with frustrating action than other types of bid resistance. 
For the variables that are exclusive to the sample selection regression, the results 
show that hostile takeover bids are associated significantly more with bid rumors and 
mandatory initial offers than other takeover bids. 
4. Frustrating action and target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids 
It would seem that incumbent CEOs are more likely to trigger frustrating action as a 
ploy for their own ends than for the advantage of target stockholders. In this section, we 
examine whether the motivational implications for this type of resistance are reflected in the 
target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids. We present and discuss results from 
basic models for the expected target stockholder wealth effects in Section 4.1, and do the 
same in Section 4.2 for the actual target stockholder wealth effects. Also, we account for the 
effects of censoring other takeover bids and treating the type of bid resistance as being 
exogenous in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. The independent variable of main interest for 
all models equals one for hostile takeover bids with frustrating action and zero for other 
hostile takeover bids. All models also include initial offer and target characteristics, and the 
controls for four target industries, and are, for all intents and purposes, unaffected by the 
inclusion or otherwise of the controls for bid announcement years. Also, we add the variables 
for multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids to the models for the actual target 
stockholder wealth effects. 
4.1 Expected target stockholder wealth effects 
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 In Columns (1) to (4) of Table 7, we present coefficients from linear regressions for 
the expected target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids. We model the 
expected target stockholder wealth effect as a linear, curvilinear, and natural logarithmic 
function of incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent 
directors stockholding in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The results in Column (4), upon 
which we base the discussion, blend the strongest of these functions. 
For the independent variable of main interest, the results show that hostile takeover 
bids with frustrating action are not associated with significantly different expected target 
stockholder wealth effects from other hostile takeover bids. Assuming that investors are able 
to accurately predict frustrating action in hostile takeover bids, there are two plausible 
interpretations of this result. Either, investors do not believe that incumbent CEOs are more 
likely to trigger frustrating action as a ploy for their own ends than for the advantage of target 
stockholders. Or, before the triggering of frustrating action, investors are undecided about the 
motivational implications for this type of bid resistance. 
4.2 Actual target stockholder wealth effects 
In Columns (1) to (4) of Table 8, we present coefficients from linear regressions for 
the actual target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids. We model the actual 
target stockholder wealth effect as a linear, curvilinear, and natural logarithmic function of 
incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors 
stockholding in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The results in Column (4), upon which we 
base the discussion, blend the strongest of these functions. 
For the independent variable of main interest, the results show that hostile takeover 
bids with frustrating action are associated with smaller actual target stockholder wealth 
effects than other hostile takeover bids. Frustrating action is associated with a 19.13 
percentage-points decrease in the actual target stockholder wealth effect relative to other 
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types of bid resistance. This coefficient is significant at the five percent level and is indicative 
of investor realization that incumbent CEOs are more likely to have triggered frustrating 
action as a ploy for their own ends than for the advantage of target stockholders. Given that 
we now include the variables for multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids, this 
result is also independent of these bid characteristics. Both hostile takeover bids with multiple 
would-be acquirers and failed hostile takeover bids are not, however, associated with 
significantly different actual target stockholder wealth effects from other hostile takeover 
bids.          
4.3 Effect of censoring other takeover bids 
The extent to which the motivational implications for frustrating action are reflected 
in the target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids can be incorrectly estimated 
without accounting for the effect of censoring other takeover bids. This is because the type of 
resistance can be correlated with unobservable factors, such as the potential for incumbent 
CEO entrenchment and private information about the potential for target undervaluation, that 
are jointly associated with the target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids and 
the probability of general hostility in takeover bids. Of particular concern for our basic 
models for the target stockholder wealth effects is the possibility that incumbent CEOs 
threaten to trigger frustrating action during private negotiations leading to friendly takeover 
bids. 
 To address and discuss the relevance of these issues, in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 
9, we present coefficients from linear regressions, with sample selection, for the expected and 
actual target stockholder wealth effects, respectively, of hostile takeover bids. These linear 
regressions are equivalent to the basic models for the expected and actual target stockholder 
wealth effects upon which we base the discussions of Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. In 
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 9, we present average marginal effects from sample selection 
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regressions for the probability of general hostility in takeover bids. These sample selection 
regressions are equivalent to the sample selection regression in Section 3.2. The variables that 
are exclusive to the sample selection regressions now also include the post-Cadbury variable. 
This proxy for a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is an important, negative, 
predictor of general hostility in takeover bids. However, we have no a-priori reason to suspect 
that a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is also relevant when it comes to 
differences in the target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids.6 
Tests for the effect of censoring other takeover bids are insignificant. These test 
results suggest that we can examine whether the motivational implications for frustrating 
action are reflected in the target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids 
independently of predicting general hostility in takeover bids. We have all the more reason 
for doing so given that the type of resistance is insignificantly correlated with unobservable 
factors that are, insignificantly, jointly associated with the target stockholder wealth effects of 
hostile takeover bids and the probability of general hostility in takeover bids. That is, given 
that the estimates for frustrating action for the basic models for the target stockholder wealth 
effects are, for all intents and purposes, unaffected after accounting for the effect of censoring 
other takeover bids.              
4.4 Effect of treating the type of bid resistance as being exogenous  
 The extent to which the motivational implications for frustrating action are reflected 
in the target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids can also be incorrectly 
estimated without accounting for the effect of treating the type of resistance as being 
exogenous. This is because the type of resistance can be correlated with unobservable factors, 
such as the potential for incumbent CEO entrenchment and private information about the 
                                                          
6 We use Heckman maximum likelihood to estimate the linear regressions with sample selection. For all 
intents and purposes, however, the results are unaffected if we alternatively use Heckman two-step 
consistent estimates. 
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potential for target undervaluation, that are associated with the target stockholder wealth 
effects of hostile takeover bids.             
 To address and discuss the relevance of these issues, in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 
10, we present coefficients from linear regressions, with instrumental variables, for the 
expected and actual target stockholder wealth effects, respectively, of hostile takeover bids. 
Except for instrumenting the type of resistance with the probability of frustrating action in 
hostile takeover bids, these linear regressions are equivalent to the basic models for the 
expected and actual target stockholder wealth effects upon which we base the discussions of 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. In Columns (2) and (4) of Table 10, we present average 
marginal effects from probit regressions for the probability of frustrating action in hostile 
takeover bids. These probit regressions are equivalent to the probit regression of main focus 
in Section 3.1, except that now the corresponding linear regressions determine the inclusion 
of the variables for multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids, and the functional 
forms of the relationships between the probability of frustrating action and incumbent CEO 
age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors stockholding. The post-
Cadbury variable is exclusive to the probit regressions. This proxy for a wholesale lessening 
of incumbent CEO control is an important, positive, predictor of frustrating action in hostile 
takeover bids. However, we have no a-priori reason to suspect that a wholesale lessening of 
incumbent CEO control is also directly relevant when it comes to differences in the target 
stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids.7 
Tests for the effect of treating the type of bid resistance as being exogenous are 
insignificant and significant for the expected and actual target stockholder wealth effects, 
respectively. These test results suggest that we can and cannot examine whether the 
                                                          
7 See Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 190-192) for a discussion of this econometric approach. We use two-
stage least squares to estimate the linear regressions with instrumental variables. For all intents and 
purposes, however, the results are unaffected if we alternatively use limited information maximum 
likelihood and generalized method of moments.    
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motivational implications for frustrating action are reflected in the expected and actual target 
stockholder wealth effects, respectively, of hostile takeover bids without instrumenting for 
the type of resistance. The estimates for frustrating action for the basic models for the 
expected and actual target stockholder wealth effects are, however, for all intents and 
purposes, unaffected after accounting for the effect of treating the type of bid resistance as 
being exogenous. Tests for the strength of instrumenting the type of bid resistance with the 
probability of frustrating action generate reliably strong statistics. 
In the probit regressions, the, exclusive, post-Cadbury variable remains as an 
important, positive, predictor of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids after the inclusion 
of the variables for multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids. For these additional 
variables, the results show that hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are associated less 
with multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids than other hostile takeover bids, 
but significantly so only for multiple would-be acquirers. The result for multiple would-be 
acquirers gives added substance to the suggestion that frustrating action is motivated less by 
the potential for price improvements from initial offers, no matter whether other would-be 
acquirers are killed-off by frustrating action.      
5. Frustrating action and incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids   
Investors would seem to come to the conclusion that incumbent CEOs are more likely 
to have triggered frustrating action as a ploy for their own ends than for the advantage of 
target stockholders. In this section, we examine whether the motivational implications for this 
type of resistance are also reflected in the rate of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile 
takeover bids. We present and discuss results from basic likelihood models in Section 5.1, 
and do the same in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 for likelihood models that account for the effects of 
censoring other takeover bids and treating the type of bid resistance as being exogenous, 
respectively. All models also include bid and target characteristics, and the controls for four 
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target industries, and are, for all intents and purposes, unaffected by the inclusion or 
otherwise of the controls for bid announcement years. 
5.1 Basic likelihood models 
 In Columns (1) to (5) of Table 11, we present average marginal effects from probit 
regressions for the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids. We 
model the probability of incumbent CEO turnover as a linear, curvilinear, and natural 
logarithmic function of incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other 
incumbent directors stockholding in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The results in Columns 
(4) and (5), upon which we base the discussion, blend the strongest of these functions. 
 For the independent variable of main interest in Column (4), the results show that 
hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are associated more with incumbent CEO 
turnover than other hostile takeover bids. Frustrating action is associated with a 27.31 
percentage-points increase in the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile 
takeover bids relative to other types of resistance. This average marginal effect is significant 
at the one percent level and suggests that hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are 
more likely to be disciplinary than other hostile takeover bids. Given that we include the 
variables for multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids, this result is also 
independent of these bid characteristics. Both hostile takeover bids with multiple would-be 
acquirers and failed hostile takeover bids are associated less with incumbent CEO turnover 
than other hostile takeover bids, but significantly so only for failed hostile takeover bids. 
 In Column (5), we add an interaction term between the variable of main interest and 
the variable for failed takeover bids. The result for the interaction term shows that failed 
hostile takeover bids with frustrating action are also associated more with incumbent CEO 
turnover than other failed hostile takeover bids. Frustrating action is associated with a 38.13 
percentage-points increase in the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after failed hostile 
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takeover bids relative to other types of resistance. This average marginal effect is significant 
at the one percent level and is indicative of surviving incumbent boards and investors acting 
on the realization that incumbent CEOs are more likely to have triggered frustrating action as 
a ploy for their own ends than for the advantage of target stockholders. Klein and Rosenfeld 
(1988) and Denis (1990) present empirical analysis with much the same interpretation, but do 
so only for selective forms of frustrating action and with no control group for other types of 
bid resistance.  
Conditional on having triggered frustrating action, however, incumbent CEOs are 
significantly (28.84 percentage-points) more likely to survive after failed hostile takeover 
bids, which gives added substance to the suggestion that frustrating action is motivated more 
by the potential for incumbent CEO entrenchment.                     
5.2 Effect of censoring other takeover bids 
 The extent to which the motivational implications for frustrating action are reflected 
in the rate of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids can be incorrectly estimated 
without accounting for the effect of censoring other takeover bids. This is because the type of 
resistance can be correlated with unobservable factors, such as the potential for incumbent 
CEO entrenchment and private information about the potential for target undervaluation, that 
are jointly associated with the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover 
bids and the probability of general hostility in takeover bids. Of particular concern for our 
basic likelihood models is the possibility that incumbent CEOs threaten to trigger frustrating 
action during private negotiations leading to friendly takeover bids. 
 To address and discuss the relevance of these issues, in Column (1) of Table 12, we 
present average marginal effects from a probit regression, with sample selection, for the 
probability of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids. This probit regression is 
equivalent to the basic likelihood model upon which we base the initial discussion of Section 
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5.1. In Column (2) of Table 12, we present average marginal effects from a sample selection 
regression for the probability of general hostility in takeover bids. This sample selection 
regression is equivalent to the sample selection regression in Section 3.2. The variables that 
are exclusive to the sample selection regression now also include the post-Cadbury variable. 
This proxy for a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is an important, negative, 
predictor of general hostility in takeover bids. However, we have no a-priori reason to suspect 
that a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is also relevant when it comes to 
differences in the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids. 
 A test for the effect of censoring other takeover bids is insignificant. This test result 
suggests that we can examine whether the motivational implications for frustrating action are 
reflected in the rate of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids independently of 
predicting general hostility in takeover bids. We have all the more reason for doing so given 
that the type of resistance is insignificantly correlated with unobservable factors that are, 
insignificantly, jointly associated with the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after 
hostile takeover bids and the probability of general hostility in takeover bids. That is, given 
that the estimate for frustrating action for the basic likelihood model is, for all intents and 
purposes, unaffected after accounting for the effect of censoring other takeover bids. 
5.3 Effect of treating the type of bid resistance as being exogenous 
The extent to which the motivational implications for frustrating action are reflected 
in the rate of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids can also be incorrectly 
estimated without accounting for the effect of treating the type of resistance as being 
exogenous. This is because the type of resistance can be correlated with unobservable factors, 
such as the potential for incumbent CEO entrenchment and private information about the 
potential for target undervaluation, that are associated with the probability of incumbent CEO 
turnover after hostile takeover bids. Also of concern is the reverse possibility that the 
30 
 
predicted rate of incumbent CEO turnover is the cause of the motivational implications for 
frustrating action.8 
 To address and discuss the relevance of these issues, in Column (1) of Table 13, we 
present average marginal effects from a probit regression, with an instrumental variable, for 
the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids. Except for 
instrumenting the type of resistance with the probability of frustrating action in hostile 
takeover bids, this probit regression is equivalent to the basic likelihood model upon which 
we base the initial discussion of Section 5.1. In Column (2) of Table 13, we present average 
marginal effects from a probit regression for the probability of frustrating action in hostile 
takeover bids. This probit regression is equivalent to the probit regression of main focus in 
Section 3.1, except that now the probit regression for incumbent CEO turnover determines 
the inclusion of the variables for multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids, and 
the functional forms of the relationships between the probability of frustrating action and 
incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors 
stockholding. The post-Cadbury variable is exclusive to the probit regression for frustrating 
action. This proxy for a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is an important, 
positive, predictor of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. However, we have no a-priori 
reason to suspect that a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is also directly 
relevant when it comes to differences in the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after 
hostile takeover bids.9 
A test for the effect of treating the type of bid resistance as being exogenous is 
insignificant. This test result suggests that we can examine whether the motivational 
implications for frustrating action are reflected in the rate of incumbent CEO turnover after 
                                                          
8 Harford (2003) presents empirical results showing that general hostility in takeover bids is a precursor of 
a higher rate of incumbent managerial turnover.      
9 We use maximum likelihood to estimate the probit regression with an instrumental variable. For all 
intents and purposes, however, the results are unaffected if we alternatively use Newey two-step consistent 
estimates.  
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hostile takeover bids without instrumenting for the type of resistance. The estimate for 
frustrating action for the basic likelihood model is, however, for all intents and purposes, 
unaffected after accounting for the effect of treating the type of bid resistance as being 
exogenous. 
6. Conclusion       
In this study, we examine the motivational implications for frustrating action in 
hostile takeover bids. Our findings suggest that frustrating action is motivated less by target 
undervaluation and the potential for price improvements from initial offers than other types 
of bid resistance. Also, frustrating action would seem to be motivated more by incumbent 
CEO inefficiency and control and, hence, the potential for entrenchment than other types of 
bid resistance. The relationships between initial offer and target characteristics and the 
probability of general hostility in takeover bids have clearer motivational implications when 
it comes to also differentiating between frustrating action and other types of resistance in 
hostile takeover bids.    
 We also find that the motivational implications for frustrating action are reflected in 
smaller target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids, and in a higher rate of 
incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids, than for other types of resistance. It 
would seem that investors, successful acquirers, and surviving incumbent boards come to the 
conclusion that incumbent CEOs are more likely to have triggered frustrating action as a ploy 
for their own ends than for the advantage of target stockholders. 
Our findings add to the ongoing debate about the legitimacy of hostility in takeover 
bids by suggesting that there should be limitations on the ability of incumbent CEOs to 
trigger frustrating action. Interestingly, however, and with hostile takeover bids on the rise 
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once more, it would seem that incumbent CEOs are turning, voluntarily or otherwise, to less 
extreme types of bid resistance.10 
                                                          
10 See A new kind of defense against hostile bids, New York Times, September 29, 2010. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Definitions for bid and target characteristics of hostile takeover bids   
This table defines bid and target characteristics of hostile takeover bids. For the dependent variables, the 
expected target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids are measured from before rumors 
through to initial offer announcements, whereas the measurement periods for the actual target stockholder 
wealth effects span the entire durations of hostile takeover bids, and one year after for failed hostile 
takeover bids. Also for the dependent variables, incumbent CEO turnover is instigated after hostile 
takeover bids by successful acquirers and by surviving incumbent boards and investors within one year of, 
and, thus, within relatively close proximity to, failed hostile takeover bids. As for the expected target 
stockholder wealth effects, for the independent variables for bid characteristics, initial offer premiums are 
also measured from before rumors of hostile takeover bids. For the independent variables that proxy for 
target information asymmetry target size is converted into natural logarithmic form in the modelling parts 
of the empirical analysis. Lastly, for the independent variables that proxy for incumbent CEO control, 
linear, curvilinear, and natural logarithmic forms for incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, 
and other incumbent directors stockholding are alternated between in the modelling parts of the empirical 
analysis. Also, although the post-Cadbury environment is associated with a wholesale lessening of 
incumbent CEO control, none of the proxies for incumbent CEO control equate to specific Cadbury 
recommendations. In particular, one of the recommendations is for incumbent CEOs and chairpersons to 
be separate directors, but not specifically for incumbent chairpersons to be independent directors. Also, the 
recommendations do not specifically require that independent directors be seated on at least one other 
board. The variables for target characteristics are measured and captured before rumors to ensure that the 
proxies for information asymmetry and CEO inefficiency and control are consistently in the absence of 
hostile takeover bids.  
Bid and target characteristics Definitions 
Dependent variables 
Expected target stockholder 
wealth effect 
Target market-adjusted returns from before rumors through to initial 
offer announcements of hostile takeover bids. Measured using the 
Datastream database with the FTSE All Share as the market 
benchmark. 
Actual target stockholder wealth 
effect 
Target market-adjusted returns from before rumors through to the 
ends of hostile takeover bids, and one year after for failed hostile 
takeover bids. Measured using the Datastream database with the 
FTSE All Share as the market benchmark.  
Incumbent CEO turnover Equals one for hostile takeover bids with incumbent CEO turnover 
afterwards in the Regulatory News Service (RNS), and within one 
year of failed hostile takeover bids, and zero for other hostile 
takeover bids.            
Independent variables 
Bid characteristics 
Multiple would-be acquirer Equals one for hostile takeover bids with improved offers from other 
would-be acquirers in the RNS and zero for other hostile takeover 
bids.    
Failed takeover bid Equals one for hostile takeover bids with withdrawn ends in the RNS 
and zero for other hostile takeover bids.   
Initial offer premium Proportionate differences between initial offer prices and the target 
stock price before rumors of hostile takeover bids. Measured using 
the RNS and the Datastream database.      
Initial cash-only offer Equals one for hostile takeover bids with initial cash-only offers in 
the RNS and zero for other hostile takeover bids.   
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Table A1 continued 
Definitions for bid and target characteristics of hostile takeover bids 
Bid and target characteristics Definitions 
Independent variables 
Proxies for target information asymmetry 
Newly-listed target Equals one for hostile takeover bids with newly-listed targets in the 
Corporate Register before rumors and zero for other hostile takeover 
bids.    
Target stock volatility Target standard deviations of daily market-adjusted returns for one 
year before rumors of hostile takeover bids. Measured using the 
Datastream database with the FTSE All Share as the market 
benchmark.   
Target financial slack  Target cash-to-assets ratios averaged over two fiscal year-ends before 
rumors of hostile takeover bids. Measured using the Datastream 
database.   
Target size Target market values of assets (in real, 2003, GBP million) averaged 
over two fiscal year-ends before rumors of hostile takeover bids. 
Measured using the Datastream database. 
Target leverage Target debt-to-assets ratios averaged over two fiscal year-ends before 
rumors of hostile takeover bids. Measured using the Datastream 
database.   
Proxies for incumbent CEO inefficiency 
Target asset-turnover ratio Target sales-to-assets ratios averaged over two fiscal year-ends 
before rumors of hostile takeover bids. Measured using the 
Datastream database.       
Target stock performance Target market-adjusted returns for one year before rumors of hostile 
takeover bids. Measured using the Datastream database with the 
FTSE All Share as the market benchmark. 
Target market-to-book ratio Target market-to-book ratios of assets averaged over two fiscal year-
ends before rumors of hostile takeover bids. Measured using the 
Datastream database.   
Proxies for incumbent CEO control 
Incumbent CEO age Incumbent CEO age in the Corporate Register before rumors of 
hostile takeover bids.             
Incumbent CEO stockholding Incumbent CEO stockholdings (in percent) in RNS filings before 
rumors of hostile takeover bids. 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding 
Other incumbent directors stockholdings (in aggregate percent) in 
RNS filings before rumors of hostile takeover bids.    
Independent incumbent 
chairperson 
Equals one for hostile takeover bids with independent incumbent 
chairpersons in RNS filings before rumors and zero for other hostile 
takeover bids. No other apparent target connections, and seated on 
the board of at least one other firm, also listed on the main London 
market, in the Corporate Register before bid rumors. 
Incumbent board size Numbers of incumbent directors in RNS filings before rumors of 
hostile takeover bids. 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director 
Equals one for hostile takeover bids with initial would-be acquirers 
with interlocking/siding incumbent directors in the RNS and zero for 
other hostile takeover bids. 
Target outside blockholdings Target outside blockholdings of at least five percent (in aggregate 
percent) in RNS filings before rumors of hostile takeover bids. No 
other apparent target connections.     
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Table 1  
Sample of hostile takeover bids  
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample time series. To construct the sample of hostile takeover bids, the starting 
point is takeover offers in the Securities Data Corporation database for UK public firms that are announced between July 1, 
1989 and December 31, 2003. The Corporate Register, first published in March 1989 and thereafter in six month intervals, 
is used to exclude takeover offers for targets that are not listed on the main London market and that belong to one of the 
following more regulated industries: financials; utilities; telecommunications; broadcasting; newspapers; public transport. 
Initial offers are announced at least one year after prior takeover bids and are for at least fifty percent of the target stock. 
Takeover bids begin from rumors and extend to improved offers from initial and other would-be acquirers announced 
within one year of prior takeover offers. These screening and merging procedures for takeover offers are carried out using 
the Regulatory News Service (RNS). Merging takeover offers in this way ensures that the actual target stockholder wealth 
effects of failed hostile takeover bids are consistently measured, and that incumbent CEO turnover after failed hostile 
takeover bids is consistently captured, in the absence of takeover offers for at least one year. Hostile takeover bids have 
RNS announcements in which incumbent CEOs reject initial offers. Other takeover bids are censored, but the effect of 
doing so is accounted for in the modelling parts of the empirical analysis. Panel A presents sample time series, by bid 
(initial offer) announcement years, for the frequencies of all takeover bids and hostile takeover bids, and Panel B does the 
same for the aggregate sizes of targets (in real, 2003, GBP million). Target size is defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. In 
1993, the corporate governance recommendations of the Cadbury Report were incorporated into the listing requirements of 
the main London market. The post-Cadbury environment makes it mandatory for incumbent boards to state the extent of 
their compliance with recommendations intended to lessen CEO control and is associated with a wholesale lessening of 
incumbent CEO control. 
Panel A: Frequencies of takeover bids 
Bid announcement years 
All takeover bids Hostile takeover bids 
Proportions for hostile 
takeover bids 
(1) (2) (3) 
1989 42 13 0.3095 
1990 55 15 0.2727 
1991 58 17 0.2931 
1992 32 11 0.3438 
1993 27 5 0.1852 
1994 33 5 0.1515 
1995 41 8 0.1951 
1996 39 8 0.2051 
1997 73 7 0.0959 
1998 85 8 0.0941 
1999 119 12 0.1008 
2000 82 7 0.0854 
2001 34 5 0.1471 
2002 34 6 0.1765 
2003 38 3 0.0789 
Total 792 130 0.1641 
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Table 1 continued  
Sample of hostile takeover bids 
Panel B: Aggregate sizes of targets (in real, 2003, GBP million) 
Bid announcement 
years 
All takeover bids 
Hostile takeover 
bids 
Proportions for 
hostile takeover bids Observations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1989 32,351.37 28,525.87 0.8818 37 
1990 17,857.70 5,260.42 0.2946 53 
1991 26,487.37 16,112.39 0.6083 56 
1992 5,449.71 4,001.31 0.7342 32 
1993 2,661.87 775.74 0.2914 22 
1994 8,625.51 5,733.94 0.6648 30 
1995 25,192.68 19,030.70 0.7554 38 
1996 11,291.71 3,523.25 0.3120 34 
1997 17,802.34 8,560.41 0.4809 69 
1998 42,226.63 4,085.01 0.0967 78 
1999 52,204.45 5,234.05 0.1003 115 
2000 106,577.50 6,332.86 0.0594 79 
2001 8,899.71 5,575.99 0.6265 33 
2002 15,028.02 634.29 0.0422 31 
2003 20,055.11 10,938.58 0.5454 35 
Total 392,711.67 124,324.80 0.3166 742 
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Table 2 
Bid and target characteristics of hostile takeover bids 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the bid and target characteristics of hostile takeover bids. Bid and target 
characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. The modelling parts of the empirical analysis are, for all intents and 
purposes, unaffected if the dependent and independent variables are windsorized. 
Bid and target characteristics 
Means Standard deviations Observations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Expected target stockholder 
wealth effect 0.2348 0.2569 119 
Actual target stockholder wealth 
effect  0.2447 0.4700 120 
Incumbent CEO turnover 0.4463 0.4992 121 
Multiple would-be acquirer 0.1923 0.3956 130 
Failed takeover bid 0.3154 0.4665 130 
Initial offer premium 0.3349 0.3728 128 
Initial cash-only offer 0.6769 0.4695 130 
Newly-listed target 0.1628 0.3706 129 
Target stock volatility 0.0220 0.0137 128 
Target financial slack 0.1054 0.1527 127 
Target size 986.70 2,336.59 126 
Target leverage 0.5544 0.1822 127 
Target asset-turnover ratio 1.3861    0.8920  127 
Target stock performance -0.3247 0.4208 128 
Target market-to-book ratio 1.3185 0.5003 126 
Incumbent CEO age 51.57 5.59 120 
Incumbent CEO stockholding 2.72  7.26 121 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding 2.21 6.51 121 
Independent incumbent 
chairperson 0.3471 0.4780 121 
Incumbent board size 7.13 2.35 121 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director 0.1231 0.3298 130 
Target outside blockholdings 29.26 20.00 121 
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Table 3 
Frustrating action in hostile takeover bids 
This table presents frequencies for the triggering of frustrating action by incumbent CEOs in hostile takeover bids. The RNS 
is used to differentiate between frustrating action and other types of bid resistance. Unlike frustrating action, other types of 
bid resistance do not amount to any operational and financial transactions that make targets less valuable and more difficult 
to acquire. These less extreme types of bid resistance amount in the main to stakeholder communication and delaying 
tactics. Litigation, however, as an example of a delaying tactic, rarely occurs in UK hostile takeover bids. Also, other 
would-be acquirers, friendly (white knight) or otherwise, cut across hostile takeover bids with frustrating action and other 
hostile takeover bids. Hostile takeover bids with any form of frustrating action are shown first. The effect of treating the 
type of bid resistance as being exogenous is accounted for in the modelling parts of the empirical analysis. Incumbent 
CEOs, however, trigger several, and sometimes multiple, forms of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. Defensive 
divestment is the demerging and selling of target, crown-jewel, assets. Defensive acquisition is making counter, pac-man, 
takeover offers, buying other firms or assets, and creating joint ventures. Defensive payout is the repurchasing of the target 
stock and the paying of special dividends. Golden parachute is introducing special compensation payments in the event of 
incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids. Defensive management buyout is taking targets private. White squire is 
the facilitating of alliances by acquisitions of target toeholds below the thirty percent threshold for mandatory takeover 
offers. The main concern for a study of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids is the pre-existence of legal provisions or 
mechanisms in corporate charters and States of incorporation that can give firms takeover protection. Although the effect of 
censoring non-targets can be accounted for, for targets, because of the pre-existence of these structural defenses, it is 
possible that not all bid resistance will be observed. There therefore remains the concern of incompletely differentiating 
between frustrating action and other types of resistance in hostile takeover bids. In contrast to the situation in the US, 
company laws have consistently rendered structural defenses absent in the UK. For these reasons, frustrating action is 
examined in UK hostile takeover bids. Also, given that the post-Cadbury environment is associated with a wholesale 
lessening of incumbent CEO control, incorporation of the Cadbury recommendations into the listing requirements of the 
main London market in 1993 was an exogenous event potentially affecting the ability of incumbent CEOs to trigger 
hostility and frustrating action. Differentiating between target fiscal year-ends before and after incorporation of the Cadbury 
recommendations into the listing requirements of the main London market can also potentially serve as a reliably strong 
exclusive variable for predicting general hostility in takeover bids and frustrating action in hostile takeover bids in the 
modelling parts of the empirical analysis that account for the effects of censoring other takeover bids and treating the type 
of bid resistance as being exogenous, respectively. For these reasons, frustrating action is examined in hostile takeover bids 
before and after the Cadbury Report in the years 1989-2003. 
Forms of frustrating action 
Frequencies of hostile 
takeover bids 
Proportions of hostile 
takeover bids Observations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Any form of frustrating action 53 0.4077 130 
Defensive divestment 26 0.2000 130 
Defensive acquisition 17 0.1308 130 
Defensive payout 8 0.0615 130 
Golden parachute 5 0.0385 130 
Defensive management buyout 5 0.0385 130 
White squire 4 0.0308 130 
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Table 4 
Predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids   
This table presents average marginal effects from probit regressions for the probability of frustrating action in hostile 
takeover bids. The probability of frustrating action is modelled as a linear, curvilinear, and natural logarithmic function of 
incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors stockholding in Columns (1) to (3), 
respectively. Column (4) blends the strongest of these functions. The dependent variable for all models equals one for 
hostile takeover bids with frustrating action and zero for other hostile takeover bids. All models include initial offer and 
target characteristics, and, to proxy for a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control, a post-Cadbury variable that 
equals one for target fiscal year-ends after June 30, 1993 in the RNS before bid rumors and zero for other target fiscal year-
ends. Also, all models include controls for four target industries and are, for all intents and purposes, unaffected by the 
inclusion or otherwise of controls for bid announcement years. The Corporate Register is used to combine target, ICB, 
industries into four groups as follows: (i) oil & gas and basic materials; (ii) industrials, including technology hardware & 
equipment; (iii) consumer goods and healthcare; (iv) consumer services, including software & computers services. Although 
target size and incumbent board size are highly correlated, the average marginal effects for target size remain insignificant if 
incumbent board size is dropped from all models. Also, the estimates for initial offer and target characteristics are, for all 
intents and purposes, unaffected if target size is dropped from all models. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
Initial offer and target 
characteristics 
Probability of frustrating action 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial offer premium 0.4305*** 0.4589*** 0.3686*** 0.4447*** 
 (0.1048) (0.1027) (0.0941) (0.0971) 
Initial cash-only offer -0.1269* -0.1589** -0.1462** -0.1646** 
 (0.0736) (0.0656) (0.0738) (0.0674) 
Newly-listed target -0.4488*** -0.4501*** -0.4529*** -0.4484*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0278) (0.0325) (0.0281) 
Target stock volatility -7.3131 -7.1442* -6.2481 -7.7159* 
 (4.5677) (4.0427) (4.3126) (4.0747) 
Target financial slack -0.5445* -0.6522* -0.2479 -0.6825** 
 (0.3219) (0.3338) (0.2930) (0.3274) 
ln(Target size) -0.0073 -0.0007 -0.0075 -0.0026 
 (0.0334) (0.0318) (0.0346) (0.0319) 
Target leverage 0.0758 0.1875 0.0968 0.2615 
 (0.2473) (0.2446) (0.2432) (0.2269) 
Target asset-turnover ratio -0.1983*** -0.2223*** -0.1845*** -0.2234*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0468) (0.0456) (0.0477) 
Target stock performance -0.0362 0.0385 0.0089 0.0274 
 (0.1105) (0.0992) (0.1090) (0.0951) 
Target market-to-book ratio 0.0416 0.0139 0.0010 0.0095 
 (0.1102) (0.1037) (0.1105) (0.1020) 
Incumbent CEO age 0.0085 0.2052***  0.2127*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0727)  (0.0736) 
Incumbent CEO age2  -0.0019***  -0.0020*** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
ln(Incumbent CEO age)   0.3029  
   (0.3266)  
Incumbent CEO stockholding 0.0362*** 0.0584**  0.0387*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0282)  (0.0078) 
Incumbent CEO stockholding2  -0.0008   
  (0.0010)   
ln(1 + Incumbent CEO 
stockholding)   0.1954***  
   (0.0481)  
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding 
 
-0.0713*** 
 
-0.0809 
 
 
 
-0.0720*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0521)  (0.0191) 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding2  0.0006   
  (0.0047)   
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Table 4 continued 
Predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids 
Initial offer and target 
characteristics 
Probability of frustrating action 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(1 + Other incumbent directors 
stockholding)   -0.2342***  
   (0.0786)  
Independent incumbent 
chairperson -0.1369* -0.1552** -0.1263* -0.1665** 
 (0.0721) (0.0710) (0.0762) (0.0687) 
Incumbent board size -0.0445* -0.0519** -0.0399* -0.0506** 
 (0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0210) (0.0222) 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director -0.3033*** -0.3169*** -0.2691*** -0.3207*** 
 (0.0784) (0.0728) (0.0906) (0.0718) 
Target outside blockholdings -0.0100*** -0.0113*** -0.0088*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Post-Cadbury 0.5698*** 0.5565*** 0.5874*** 0.5568*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0328) (0.0360) (0.0344) 
Constant 0.4401*** 0.4433*** 0.4406*** 0.4429*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0262) (0.0283) (0.0263) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years Yes Yes Yes No 
Chi2 test for model significance 502.75*** 630.65*** 561.98*** 696.13*** 
Pseudo R2 statistic for model fit  51.50 54.57 49.13 54.36 
Observations 119 119 119 119 
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Table 5 
Predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids: Supplementary results for incumbent CEO age   
This table presents probabilities of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids for ages and incremental ages of incumbent 
CEOs. These probabilities of frustrating action are from the probit regression in Column (4) of Table 4. Probabilities and 
incremental probabilities of frustrating action are shown in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
 
Incumbent CEO ages 
Probabilities of frustrating 
action Incremental 
incumbent CEO ages 
Incremental probabilities 
of frustrating action 
(1) (2) 
38 0.1129**   
 (0.0477)   
40 0.1686*** 38-40 0.0557*** 
 (0.0611)  (0.0160) 
42 0.2407*** 40-42 0.0721*** 
 (0.0632)  (0.0118) 
44 0.3185*** 42-44 0.0778*** 
 (0.0539)  (0.0179) 
46 0.3894*** 44-46 0.0709*** 
 (0.0421)  (0.0215) 
48 0.4458*** 46-48 0.0563*** 
 (0.0349)  (0.0189) 
50 0.4852*** 48-50 0.0395*** 
 (0.0325)  (0.0146) 
52 0.5083*** 50-52 0.0231* 
 (0.0322)  (0.0118) 
54 0.5161*** 52-54 0.0078 
 (0.0332)  (0.0117) 
56 0.5091*** 54-56 -0.0070 
 (0.0371)  (0.0143) 
58 0.4869*** 56-58 -0.0222 
 (0.0466)  (0.0188) 
60 0.4484*** 58-60 -0.0385 
 (0.0639)  (0.0247) 
62 0.3929*** 60-62 -0.0554* 
 (0.0879)  (0.0300) 
64 0.3227*** 62-64 -0.0703** 
 (0.1128)  (0.0300) 
66 0.2449* 64-66 -0.0777*** 
 (0.1262)  (0.0194) 
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Table 6 
Predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids: Effect of censoring other takeover bids 
This table presents average marginal effects from a probit regression, with sample selection, for the probability of 
frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. Shown in Column (1), this probit regression is equivalent to the probit regression 
in Column (4) of Table 4. Average marginal effects from a sample selection regression for the probability of general 
hostility in takeover bids are shown in Column (2). The dependent variable for this sample selection regression equals one 
for hostile takeover bids and zero for other takeover bids. Because of manual data collection limitations for the variables 
that proxy for incumbent CEO control, the sample selection regression includes initial offer and target characteristics 
through to target leverage in the probit regression. However, as for the probit regression, the sample selection regression 
includes the post-Cadbury variable to proxy for a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control. To differentiate the 
sample selection regression from the probit regression, the sample selection regression includes, and the probit regression 
excludes, variables for bid rumors and mandatory initial offers. The first of these variables equals one for takeover bids with 
bid rumors in the RNS and zero for other takeover bids, and the second variable equals one for takeover bids with 
mandatory initial offers in the RNS, when initial would-be acquirers raise their target toeholds to at least thirty percent, and 
zero for other takeover bids. It is expected that these variables are important, positive, predictors of general hostility in 
takeover bids because bid rumors are normally an indication that approaches by initial would-be acquirers have failed to 
result in friendly takeover bids, and because mandatory initial offers are generally associated with unsolicited takeover bids. 
However, there is no a-priori reason to suspect that these variables are also relevant when it comes to differentiating 
between frustrating action and other types of resistance in hostile takeover bids. A test for the effect of censoring other 
takeover bids is shown at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
Initial offer and target 
characteristics 
Probability of frustrating action Probability of general hostility 
(1) (2) 
Initial offer premium 0.4424*** -0.1332** 
 (0.1156) (0.0618) 
Initial cash-only offer -0.1606* 0.1530*** 
 (0.0847) (0.0405) 
Newly-listed target -0.4312*** -0.1287** 
 (0.1366) (0.0536) 
Target stock volatility -8.0529* -5.4648*** 
 (4.5880) (2.0664) 
Target financial slack -0.6893** 0.1131 
 (0.3250) (0.1499) 
ln(Target size) 0.0003 0.0833*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0144) 
Target leverage 0.2535 -0.3831*** 
 (0.2363) (0.1129) 
Target asset-turnover ratio -0.2264*** 0.0395 
 (0.0482) (0.0277) 
Target stock performance 0.0194 -0.2057*** 
 (0.1197) (0.0473) 
Target market-to-book ratio 0.0056 -0.1041** 
 (0.1139) (0.0431) 
Incumbent CEO age 0.2127***  
 (0.0761)  
Incumbent CEO age2 -0.0020***  
 (0.0007)  
Incumbent CEO stockholding 0.0390***  
 (0.0077)  
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding -0.0729***  
 (0.0190)  
Independent incumbent 
chairperson -0.1686**  
 (0.0663)  
Incumbent board size -0.0515**  
 (0.0230)  
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Table 6 continued 
Predicting frustrating action in hostile takeover bids: Effect of censoring other takeover bids 
Initial offer and target 
characteristics 
Probability of frustrating action Probability of general hostility 
(1) (2) 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director -0.3118***  
 (0.0983)  
Target outside blockholdings -0.0113***  
 (0.0024)  
Post-Cadbury 0.5535*** -0.2994*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0407) 
Bid rumors  0.2365*** 
  (0.0459) 
Mandatory initial offer  0.1379* 
  (0.0772) 
Constant 0.4224** 0.4249*** 
 (0.1651) (0.0250) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years No No 
Chi2 test for model significance 683.67*** 
Chi2 test for effect of censoring 
other takeover bids 0.02 
Observations 674 
Censored observations 555 
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Table 7 
Frustrating action and expected target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids 
This table presents coefficients from linear regressions for the expected target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover 
bids. The expected target stockholder wealth effect is modelled as a linear, curvilinear, and natural logarithmic function of 
incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors stockholding in Columns (1) to (3), 
respectively. Column (4) blends the strongest of these functions. The independent variable of main interest for all models 
equals one for hostile takeover bids with frustrating action and zero for other hostile takeover bids. All models also include 
initial offer and target characteristics, and the controls for four target industries, and are, for all intents and purposes, 
unaffected by the inclusion or otherwise of the controls for bid announcement years. The Corporate Register is used to 
combine target, ICB, industries into four groups as follows: (i) oil & gas and basic materials; (ii) industrials, including 
technology hardware & equipment; (iii) consumer goods and healthcare; (iv) consumer services, including software & 
computers services. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, 
and ten percent level, respectively. 
Initial offer and target 
characteristics 
Expected target stockholder wealth effect  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frustrating action -0.0316 -0.0303 -0.0352 -0.0299 
 (0.0289) (0.0315) (0.0303) (0.0304) 
Initial offer premium 0.5397*** 0.5429*** 0.5436*** 0.5424*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0588) (0.0574) (0.0562) 
Initial cash-only offer 0.1036*** 0.1168*** 0.1057*** 0.1170*** 
 (0.0390) (0.0399) (0.0386) (0.0399) 
Newly-listed target 0.0265 0.0340 0.0233 0.0345 
 (0.0445) (0.0430) (0.0434) (0.0432) 
Target stock volatility 1.5585 2.2132 1.9625 2.2056 
 (1.7809) (1.7678) (1.7141) (1.7562) 
Target financial slack 0.0145 0.0487 0.0296 0.0438 
 (0.0935) (0.1055) (0.0918) (0.0922) 
ln(Target size) 0.0334*** 0.0291** 0.0271** 0.0288** 
 (0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0124) 
Target leverage -0.0610 -0.0813 -0.0652 -0.0799 
 (0.0936) (0.0985) (0.0932) (0.0935) 
Target asset-turnover ratio 0.0145 0.0158 0.0116 0.0158 
 (0.0205) (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0214) 
Target stock performance 0.0459 0.0666 0.0595 0.0665 
 (0.0450) (0.0474) (0.0471) (0.0466) 
Target market-to-book ratio 0.0125 0.0054 0.0126 0.0060 
 (0.0304) (0.0290) (0.0294) (0.0277) 
Incumbent CEO age 0.0008 -0.0679**  -0.0677** 
 (0.0026) (0.0306)  (0.0301) 
Incumbent CEO age2  0.0007**  0.0007** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
ln(Incumbent CEO age)   0.0136  
   (0.1308)  
Incumbent CEO stockholding 0.0021 0.0031  0.0020 
 (0.0021) (0.0111)  (0.0022) 
Incumbent CEO stockholding2  -0.0000   
  (0.0004)   
ln(1 + Incumbent CEO 
stockholding)   0.0091  
   (0.0158)  
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding 0.0005 -0.0084  -0.0082 
 (0.0016) (0.0094)  (0.0085) 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding2  0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
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Table 7 continued 
Frustrating action and expected target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids 
Initial offer and target 
characteristics 
Expected target stockholder wealth effect  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(1 + Other incumbent directors 
stockholding)   -0.0203  
   (0.0236)  
Independent incumbent 
chairperson -0.0169 -0.0196 -0.0202 -0.0196 
 (0.0286) (0.0277) (0.0283) (0.0274) 
Incumbent board size 0.0008 0.0004 0.0010 0.0006 
 (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0071) 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director -0.0950 -0.0981 -0.0919 -0.0979 
 (0.0595) (0.0618) (0.0564) (0.0618) 
Target outside blockholdings -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Constant -0.6604** 1.1931 -0.5305 1.1889 
 (0.2901) (0.8428) (0.6118) (0.8309) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years Yes Yes Yes No 
F test for model significance 13.60*** 51.02*** 13.34*** 46.41*** 
R2 statistic for model fit  79.46 80.59 79.56 80.58 
Observations 118 118 118 118 
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Table 8 
Frustrating action and actual target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids 
This table presents coefficients from linear regressions for the actual target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover 
bids. The actual target stockholder wealth effect is modelled as a linear, curvilinear, and natural logarithmic function of 
incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors stockholding in Columns (1) to (3), 
respectively. Column (4) blends the strongest of these functions. The independent variable of main interest for all models 
equals one for hostile takeover bids with frustrating action and zero for other hostile takeover bids. All models also include 
initial offer and target characteristics, and the controls for four target industries, and are, for all intents and purposes, 
unaffected by the inclusion or otherwise of the controls for bid announcement years. The Corporate Register is used to 
combine target, ICB, industries into four groups as follows: (i) oil & gas and basic materials; (ii) industrials, including 
technology hardware & equipment; (iii) consumer goods and healthcare; (iv) consumer services, including software & 
computers services. Also, the variables for multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids are added to all models. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, 
respectively.     
Bid and target characteristics 
Actual target stockholder wealth effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frustrating action -0.1972** -0.1881** -0.2032** -0.1913** 
 (0.0824) (0.0768) (0.0826) (0.0768) 
Multiple would-be acquirer 0.1099 0.0739 0.1035 0.0727 
 (0.0980) (0.0956) (0.0984) (0.0932) 
Failed takeover bid -0.0436 -0.0414 -0.0584 -0.0520 
 (0.0961) (0.0930) (0.0945) (0.0877) 
Initial offer premium 0.6192*** 0.6189*** 0.6286*** 0.6218*** 
 (0.0951) (0.0977) (0.1003) (0.0977) 
Initial cash-only offer 0.3705*** 0.4183*** 0.3735*** 0.4109*** 
 (0.0889) (0.0876) (0.0866) (0.0859) 
Newly-listed target -0.1172 -0.0799 -0.1318 -0.0939 
 (0.1029) (0.1091) (0.1003) (0.1079) 
Target stock volatility 6.3566 8.0835* 7.6095 8.2989* 
 (4.5686) (4.5726) (4.6714) (4.6114) 
Target financial slack -0.0942 -0.0920 -0.0141 -0.0027 
 (0.2498) (0.2765) (0.2512) (0.2487) 
ln(Target size) 0.0983*** 0.0797** 0.0828*** 0.0841*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0308) (0.0288) (0.0300) 
Target leverage -0.3478 -0.3696 -0.3788* -0.4099* 
 (0.2280) (0.2278) (0.2222) (0.2412) 
Target asset-turnover ratio 0.1075* 0.1141* 0.0988* 0.1123* 
 (0.0573) (0.0583) (0.0568) (0.0589) 
Target stock performance 0.1632 0.2117* 0.2087* 0.2162* 
 (0.1181) (0.1256) (0.1213) (0.1262) 
Target market-to-book ratio -0.0867 -0.0898 -0.0820 -0.0927 
 (0.0708) (0.0705) (0.0729) (0.0711) 
Incumbent CEO age -0.0033 -0.2188**  -0.2217** 
 (0.0068) (0.0874)  (0.0862) 
Incumbent CEO age2  0.0021**  0.0021** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
ln(Incumbent CEO age)   -0.2860  
   (0.3540)  
Incumbent CEO stockholding 0.0127** -0.0097  0.0141** 
 (0.0061) (0.0341)  (0.0055) 
Incumbent CEO stockholding2  0.0010   
  (0.0013)   
ln(1 + Incumbent CEO 
stockholding)   0.0797  
   (0.0535)  
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding -0.0004 -0.0215  -0.0236 
 (0.0039) (0.0160)  (0.0163) 
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Table 8 continued 
Frustrating action and actual target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids 
Bid and target characteristics 
Actual target stockholder wealth effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding2  0.0003  0.0004 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
ln(1 + Other incumbent directors 
stockholding)   -0.0671  
   (0.0507)  
Independent incumbent 
chairperson 0.0125 -0.0011 0.0083 0.0029 
 (0.0791) (0.0791) (0.0790) (0.0798) 
Incumbent board size 0.0016 0.0032 0.0007 0.0003 
 (0.0176) (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0164) 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director -0.1057 -0.1103 -0.1060 -0.1133 
 (0.0999) (0.1085) (0.1008) (0.1089) 
Target outside blockholdings -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0010 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Constant -1.8887*** 3.9357* -0.5394 4.0025* 
 (0.6932) (2.2978) (1.4671) (2.2699) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years Yes Yes Yes No 
F test for model significance 6.00*** 25.68*** 5.54*** 25.11*** 
R2 statistic for model fit  62.43 65.94 62.75 65.63 
Observations 119 119 119 119 
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Table 9 
Frustrating action and target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids: Effect of censoring other takeover 
bids  
This table presents coefficients from linear regressions, with sample selection, for the target stockholder wealth effects of 
hostile takeover bids. Shown in Columns (1) and (3), these linear regressions for the expected and actual target stockholder 
wealth effects, respectively, are equivalent to the linear regressions for the expected and actual target stockholder wealth 
effects in Column (4) of Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Average marginal effects from sample selection regressions for the 
probability of general hostility in takeover bids are shown in Columns (2) and (4). These sample selection regressions are 
equivalent to the sample selection regression in Column (2) of Table 6. The variables that are exclusive to the sample 
selection regressions now also include the post-Cadbury variable. This proxy for a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO 
control is an important, negative, predictor of general hostility in takeover bids. However, there is no a-priori reason to 
suspect that a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is also relevant when it comes to differences in the target 
stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids. Heckman maximum likelihood is used to estimate the linear regressions 
with sample selection. For all intents and purposes, however, the linear regressions with sample selection are unaffected if 
Heckman two-step consistent estimates are alternatively used. Tests for the effect of censoring other takeover bids are 
shown at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
Bid and target characteristics 
Expected target 
stockholder wealth 
effect 
Probability of 
general hostility 
Actual target 
stockholder wealth 
effect 
Probability of 
general hostility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frustrating action -0.0295  -0.1925***  
 (0.0246)  (0.0637)  
Multiple would-be acquirer   0.0676  
   (0.0757)  
Failed takeover bid   -0.0545  
   (0.0713)  
Initial offer premium 0.5274*** -0.1201** 0.6051*** -0.1333** 
 (0.0460) (0.0608) (0.0823) (0.0614) 
Initial cash-only offer 0.1339*** 0.1409*** 0.4307*** 0.1496*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0400) (0.0752) (0.0404) 
Newly-listed target 0.0230 -0.1220** -0.1091 -0.1289** 
 (0.0380) (0.0539) (0.0903) (0.0536) 
Target stock volatility 1.9508 -5.5367*** 7.9546** -5.5169*** 
 (1.4479) (2.1006) (3.7780) (2.0688) 
Target financial slack 0.0410 0.0895 -0.0018 0.1150 
 (0.0805) (0.1536) (0.2033) (0.1498) 
ln(Target size) 0.0373*** 0.0858*** 0.0947*** 0.0825*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0147) (0.0301) (0.0147) 
Target leverage -0.1214 -0.3702*** -0.4626** -0.3757*** 
 (0.0834) (0.1124) (0.2218) (0.1151) 
Target asset-turnover ratio 0.0176 0.0402 0.1155** 0.0384 
 (0.0181) (0.0277) (0.0487) (0.0280) 
Target stock performance 0.0481 -0.2141*** 0.1927* -0.2068*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0472) (0.1082) (0.0471) 
Target market-to-book ratio -0.0003 -0.1164** -0.1003* -0.1041** 
 (0.0232) (0.0465) (0.0606) (0.0428) 
Incumbent CEO age -0.0699***  -0.2245***  
 (0.0242)  (0.0700)  
Incumbent CEO age2 0.0007***  0.0021***  
 (0.0002)  (0.0007)  
Incumbent CEO stockholding 0.0023  0.0143***  
 (0.0017)  (0.0045)  
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding -0.0081  -0.0236*  
 (0.0070)  (0.0135)  
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Table 9 continued 
Frustrating action and target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids: Effect of censoring other takeover 
bids 
Bid and target characteristics 
Expected target 
stockholder wealth 
effect 
Probability of 
general hostility 
Actual target 
stockholder wealth 
effect 
Probability of 
general hostility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding2 0.0001  0.0004*  
 (0.0001)  (0.0002)  
Independent incumbent 
chairperson -0.0208  -0.0001  
 (0.0224)  (0.0651)  
Incumbent board size 0.0004  -0.0002  
 (0.0058)  (0.0135)  
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director -0.0925*  -0.1084  
 (0.0504)  (0.0894)  
Target outside blockholdings -0.0005  -0.0011  
 (0.0009)  (0.0017)  
Post-Cadbury  -0.2872***  -0.2982*** 
  (0.0406)  (0.0409) 
Bid rumors  0.2405***  0.2399*** 
  (0.0454)  (0.0466) 
Mandatory initial offer  0.1601**  0.1363* 
  (0.0762)  (0.0752) 
Constant 1.0781 0.4234*** 3.8687** 0.4241*** 
 (0.6777) (0.0251) (1.8719) (0.0251) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years No No No No 
Chi2 test for model significance 1816.00*** 1310.02*** 
Chi2 test for effect of censoring 
other takeover bids 2.53 0.64 
Observations 673 674 
Censored observations 555 555 
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Table 10 
Frustrating action and target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids: Effect of treating the type of bid 
resistance as being exogenous  
This table presents coefficients from linear regressions, with instrumental variables, for the target stockholder wealth effects 
of hostile takeover bids. Shown in Columns (1) and (3), except for instrumenting the type of resistance with the probability 
of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids, these linear regressions for the expected and actual target stockholder wealth 
effects, respectively, are equivalent to the linear regressions for the expected and actual target stockholder wealth effects in 
Column (4) of Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Average marginal effects from probit regressions for the probability of 
frustrating action in hostile takeover bids are shown in Columns (2) and (4). These probit regressions are equivalent to the 
probit regression in Column (4) of Table 4, except that now the corresponding linear regressions determine the inclusion of 
the variables for multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids, and the functional forms of the relationships between 
the probability of frustrating action and incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors 
stockholding. The post-Cadbury variable is exclusive to the probit regressions. This proxy for a wholesale lessening of 
incumbent CEO control is an important, positive, predictor of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. However, there is 
no a-priori reason to suspect that a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is also directly relevant when it comes to 
differences in the target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids. Two-stage least squares is used to estimate the 
linear regressions with instrumental variables. For all intents and purposes, however, the linear regressions with 
instrumental variables are unaffected if limited information maximum likelihood and generalized method of moments are 
alternatively used. Tests for the effect of treating the type of bid resistance as being exogenous, and for the strength of 
instrumenting the type of bid resistance with the probability of frustrating action, are shown at the bottom of the table. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, 
respectively.     
Bid and target characteristics 
Expected target 
stockholder wealth 
effect 
Probability of 
frustrating action 
Actual target 
stockholder wealth 
effect 
Probability of 
frustrating action 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frustrating action (instrumented) -0.0025  -0.3654***  
 (0.0536)  (0.1105)  
Multiple would-be acquirer   0.0318 -0.3370*** 
   (0.0785) (0.0412) 
Failed takeover bid   -0.0493 -0.0553 
   (0.0731) (0.0687) 
Initial offer premium 0.5360*** 0.4471*** 0.6616*** 0.5667*** 
 (0.0498) (0.0973) (0.0882) (0.1297) 
Initial cash-only offer 0.1200*** -0.1629** 0.3969*** -0.2093*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0668) (0.0702) (0.0609) 
Newly-listed target 0.0460 -0.4485*** -0.1668* -0.4403*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0282) (0.0962) (0.0245) 
Target stock volatility 2.3698 -7.5263* 7.3265* -8.5628* 
 (1.5129) (4.0243) (4.1632) (4.3973) 
Target financial slack 0.0406 -0.6937** 0.0148 -0.9117*** 
 (0.0746) (0.3244) (0.2024) (0.3342) 
ln(Target size) 0.0286*** -0.0017 0.0850*** 0.0150 
 (0.0103) (0.0317) (0.0274) (0.0295) 
Target leverage -0.0845 0.2447 -0.3817** 0.3758* 
 (0.0774) (0.2416) (0.1888) (0.1964) 
Target asset-turnover ratio 0.0191 -0.2220*** 0.0920* -0.2409*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0475) (0.0481) (0.0613) 
Target stock performance 0.0677* 0.0264 0.1991* -0.0513 
 (0.0388) (0.0956) (0.1050) (0.0914) 
Target market-to-book ratio 0.0102 0.0112 -0.1065* 0.0459 
 (0.0250) (0.1022) (0.0599) (0.0888) 
Incumbent CEO age -0.0719*** 0.2119*** -0.1993*** 0.2018*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0748) (0.0735) (0.0587) 
Incumbent CEO age2 0.0007*** -0.0020*** 0.0019*** -0.0018*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Incumbent CEO stockholding 0.0015 0.0395*** 0.0179*** 0.0460*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0081) (0.0045) (0.0095) 
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Table 10 continued 
Frustrating action and target stockholder wealth effects of hostile takeover bids: Effect of treating the type of bid 
resistance as being exogenous 
Bid and target characteristics 
Expected target 
stockholder wealth 
effect 
Probability of 
frustrating action 
Actual target 
stockholder wealth 
effect 
Probability of 
frustrating action 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding -0.0069 -0.0658 -0.0307** -0.0884*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0413) (0.0152) (0.0323) 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding2 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0005** 0.0009 
 (0.0001) (0.0039) (0.0002) (0.0033) 
Independent incumbent 
chairperson -0.0152 -0.1642** -0.0262 -0.2601*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0729) (0.0683) (0.0530) 
Incumbent board size 0.0011 -0.0502** -0.0040 -0.0873*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0219) (0.0150) (0.0286) 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director -0.0906* -0.3213*** -0.1600* -0.3308*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0718) (0.0901) (0.0569) 
Target outside blockholdings -0.0003 -0.0112*** -0.0016 -0.0126*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0026) 
Post-Cadbury  0.5539***  0.5278*** 
  (0.0343)  (0.0343) 
Constant 1.2831* 0.4430*** 3.5193* 0.4415*** 
 (0.6800) (0.0263) (1.9450) (0.0236) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years No No No No 
Chi2 test for model significance 2195.98*** 598.69*** 1275.45*** 585.89*** 
R2 statistic for model fit 80.43  63.78  
Pseudo R2 statistic for model fit   54.37  62.41 
Chi2 test for effect of treating the 
type of bid resistance as being 
exogenous 0.46  4.82**  
F test for instrument strength 46.74***  76.41***  
Observations 118 119 119 119 
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Table 11 
Frustrating action and incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids  
This table presents average marginal effects from probit regressions for the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after 
hostile takeover bids. The probability of incumbent CEO turnover is modelled as a linear, curvilinear, and natural 
logarithmic function of incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors stockholding in 
Columns (1) to (3), respectively. Columns (4) and (5) blend the strongest of these functions. The independent variable of 
main interest for all models equals one for hostile takeover bids with frustrating action and zero for other hostile takeover 
bids. All models also include bid and target characteristics, and the controls for four target industries, and are, for all intents 
and purposes, unaffected by the inclusion or otherwise of the controls for bid announcement years. The Corporate Register 
is used to combine target, ICB, industries into four groups as follows: (i) oil & gas and basic materials; (ii) industrials, 
including technology hardware & equipment; (iii) consumer goods and healthcare; (iv) consumer services, including 
software & computers services. Also, an interaction term between the variable of main interest and the variable for failed 
takeover bids is added in Column (5). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
Bid and target characteristics 
Probability of incumbent CEO turnover 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Frustrating action 0.2721*** 0.2837*** 0.2870*** 0.2731*** 0.1967** 
 (0.0799) (0.0738) (0.0760) (0.0788) (0.0863) 
Frustrating action × Failed 
takeover bid     0.3813*** 
     (0.0808) 
Multiple would-be acquirer -0.0903 -0.0985 -0.0801 -0.0766 -0.1014 
 (0.0991) (0.0987) (0.0954) (0.0969) (0.0895) 
Failed takeover bid -0.4254*** -0.4155*** -0.4108*** -0.4118*** -0.5207*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0691) (0.0446) 
Initial offer premium 0.0527 0.0180 0.0175 0.0277 0.0155 
 (0.1042) (0.1062) (0.1110) (0.1093) (0.1087) 
Initial cash-only offer -0.2028** -0.1683* -0.1817** -0.1811** -0.1781** 
 (0.0855) (0.0910) (0.0877) (0.0871) (0.0843) 
Newly-listed target -0.1416 -0.1114 -0.1140 -0.1237 -0.0882 
 (0.0921) (0.0884) (0.0875) (0.0874) (0.0870) 
Target stock volatility -3.0137 -2.5957 -2.9865 -3.0151 -1.5181 
 (4.4643) (4.5914) (4.4707) (4.4759) (4.3690) 
Target financial slack 0.1471 0.1623 0.2094 0.0137 -0.0938 
 (0.3960) (0.4257) (0.3811) (0.4060) (0.3932) 
ln(Target size) -0.1247*** -0.1366*** -0.1420*** -0.1319*** -0.1316*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0345) (0.0362) (0.0357) (0.0367) 
Target leverage 0.5708** 0.5723** 0.6046** 0.6172*** 0.5180** 
 (0.2407) (0.2335) (0.2359) (0.2384) (0.2531) 
Target asset-turnover ratio -0.1024* -0.1010** -0.1067** -0.1058** -0.1013* 
 (0.0526) (0.0511) (0.0531) (0.0521) (0.0542) 
Target stock performance -0.2373 -0.2132 -0.1780 -0.2162 -0.1558 
 (0.1569) (0.1525) (0.1508) (0.1523) (0.1357) 
Target market-to-book ratio 0.1329 0.1192 0.1226 0.1269 0.1662** 
 (0.0822) (0.0776) (0.0789) (0.0797) (0.0779) 
Incumbent CEO age -0.0096 -0.1298    
 (0.0066) (0.0978)    
Incumbent CEO age2  0.0012    
  (0.0009)    
ln(Incumbent CEO age)   -0.4668 -0.4677 -0.4545 
   (0.3253) (0.3298) (0.3112) 
Incumbent CEO stockholding -0.0065 -0.0440  -0.0456 -0.0661** 
 (0.0098) (0.0284)  (0.0302) (0.0287) 
Incumbent CEO stockholding2  0.0014  0.0015 0.0022* 
  (0.0012)  (0.0012) (0.0012) 
ln(1 + Incumbent CEO 
stockholding)   -0.1121*   
   (0.0637)   
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Table 11 continued 
Frustrating action and incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids 
Bid and target characteristics 
Probability of incumbent CEO turnover 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding -0.0026 -0.0038    
 (0.0059) (0.0200)    
Other incumbent directors 
stockholding2  0.0000    
  (0.0003)    
ln(1 + Other incumbent directors 
stockholding)   0.0095 -0.0009 0.0078 
   (0.0675) (0.0633) (0.0644) 
Independent incumbent 
chairperson 0.1130 0.1028 0.1045 0.1084 0.1109 
 (0.0791) (0.0779) (0.0789) (0.0775) (0.0764) 
Incumbent board size 0.0606*** 0.0630*** 0.0653*** 0.0652*** 0.0721*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0193) (0.0197) 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director 0.0202 0.0213 0.0106 0.0049 -0.0155 
 (0.1333) (0.1315) (0.1331) (0.1346) (0.1446) 
Target outside blockholdings -0.0046* -0.0049** -0.0046** -0.0045** -0.0041* 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Constant 0.4559*** 0.4550*** 0.4548*** 0.4551*** 0.4533*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0308) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years Yes Yes Yes No No 
Chi2 test for model significance 56.90** 86.12*** 56.42** 58.25** 54.81** 
Pseudo R2 statistic for model fit  37.24 38.90 38.57 38.19 41.59 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
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Table 12 
Frustrating action and incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids: Effect of censoring other takeover bids   
This table presents average marginal effects from a probit regression, with sample selection, for the probability of 
incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids. Shown in Column (1), this probit regression is equivalent to the probit 
regression in Column (4) of Table 11. Average marginal effects from a sample selection regression for the probability of 
general hostility in takeover bids are shown in Column (2). This sample selection regression is equivalent to the sample 
selection regression in Column (2) of Table 6. The variables that are exclusive to the sample selection regression now also 
include the post-Cadbury variable. This proxy for a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is an important, 
negative, predictor of general hostility in takeover bids. However, there is no a-priori reason to suspect that a wholesale 
lessening of incumbent CEO control is also relevant when it comes to differences in the probability of incumbent CEO 
turnover after hostile takeover bids. A test for the effect of censoring other takeover bids is shown at the bottom of the table. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, 
respectively. 
Bid and target characteristics 
Probability of incumbent CEO 
turnover Probability of general hostility 
(1) (2) 
Frustrating action 0.2728***  
 (0.0826)  
Multiple would-be acquirer -0.0638  
 (0.0970)  
Failed takeover bid -0.4175***  
 (0.0866)  
Initial offer premium 0.0614 -0.1308** 
 (0.1243) (0.0615) 
Initial cash-only offer -0.2115*** 0.1537*** 
 (0.0760) (0.0397) 
Newly-listed target -0.0792 -0.1302** 
 (0.1398) (0.0541) 
Target stock volatility -2.5673 -5.4810*** 
 (4.3135) (2.0661) 
Target financial slack -0.0244 0.1111 
 (0.3814) (0.1494) 
ln(Target size) -0.1501*** 0.0829*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0144) 
Target leverage 0.6864*** -0.3817*** 
 (0.2373) (0.1128) 
Target asset-turnover ratio -0.1029* 0.0391 
 (0.0527) (0.0277) 
Target stock performance -0.1851 -0.2062*** 
 (0.1635) (0.0470) 
Target market-to-book ratio 0.1429* -0.1041** 
 (0.0735) (0.0432) 
ln(Incumbent CEO age) -0.4303  
 (0.3182)  
Incumbent CEO stockholding -0.0472*  
 (0.0284)  
Incumbent CEO stockholding2 0.0016  
 (0.0012)  
ln(1 + Other incumbent directors 
stockholding) 0.0039  
 (0.0607)  
Independent incumbent 
chairperson 0.1160  
 (0.0734)  
Incumbent board size 0.0650***  
 (0.0207)  
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Table 12 continued 
Frustrating action and incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids: Effect of censoring other takeover bids 
Bid and target characteristics 
Probability of incumbent CEO 
turnover Probability of general hostility 
(1) (2) 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director -0.0097  
 (0.1302)  
Target outside blockholdings -0.0041  
 (0.0029)  
Post-Cadbury  -0.3042*** 
  (0.0425) 
Bid rumors  0.2345*** 
  (0.0471) 
Mandatory initial offer  0.1408* 
  (0.0736) 
Constant 0.5695*** 0.4260*** 
 (0.2011) (0.0251) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years No No 
Chi2 test for model significance 60.26*** 
Chi2 test for effect of censoring 
other takeover bids 0.30 
Observations 674 
Censored observations 555 
58 
 
Table 13 
Frustrating action and incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids: Effect of treating the type of bid 
resistance as being exogenous   
This table presents average marginal effects from a probit regression, with an instrumental variable, for the probability of 
incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids. Shown in Column (1), except for instrumenting the type of resistance 
with the probability of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids, this probit regression is equivalent to the probit regression 
in Column (4) of Table 11. Average marginal effects from a probit regression for the probability of frustrating action in 
hostile takeover bids are shown in Column (2). This probit regression is equivalent to the probit regression in Column (4) of 
Table 4, except that now the probit regression for incumbent CEO turnover determines the inclusion of the variables for 
multiple would-be acquirers and failed takeover bids, and the functional forms of the relationships between the probability 
of frustrating action and incumbent CEO age, incumbent CEO stockholding, and other incumbent directors stockholding. 
The post-Cadbury variable is exclusive to the probit regression for frustrating action. This proxy for a wholesale lessening 
of incumbent CEO control is an important, positive, predictor of frustrating action in hostile takeover bids. However, there 
is no a-priori reason to suspect that a wholesale lessening of incumbent CEO control is also directly relevant when it comes 
to differences in the probability of incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids. Maximum likelihood is used to 
estimate the probit regression with an instrumental variable. For all intents and purposes, however, the probit regression 
with an instrumental variable is unaffected if Newey two-step consistent estimates are alternatively used. A test for the 
effect of treating the type of bid resistance as being exogenous is shown at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
Bid and target characteristics 
Probability of incumbent CEO 
turnover Probability of frustrating action 
(1) (2) 
Frustrating action (instrumented) 0.3885***  
 (0.1323)  
Multiple would-be acquirer -0.0587 -0.3443*** 
 (0.0968) (0.0539) 
Failed takeover bid -0.3996*** -0.0800 
 (0.0725) (0.0768) 
Initial offer premium 0.0103 0.4539*** 
 (0.1100) (0.1137) 
Initial cash-only offer -0.1616* -0.2004*** 
 (0.0905) (0.0658) 
Newly-listed target -0.0769 -0.4364*** 
 (0.1038) (0.0276) 
Target stock volatility -2.1451 -7.4027* 
 (4.4153) (3.9973) 
Target financial slack 0.0030 -0.4971* 
 (0.3997) (0.2920) 
ln(Target size) -0.1284*** 0.0150 
 (0.0359) (0.0316) 
Target leverage 0.5809** 0.2928 
 (0.2357) (0.2253) 
Target asset-turnover ratio -0.0914* -0.1748*** 
 (0.0552) (0.0464) 
Target stock performance -0.2045 -0.1070 
 (0.1517) (0.1112) 
Target market-to-book ratio 0.1397* 0.0410 
 (0.0791) (0.1039) 
ln(Incumbent CEO age) -0.5187 0.5417* 
 (0.3203) (0.2786) 
Incumbent CEO stockholding -0.0465 0.0541* 
 (0.0288) (0.0305) 
Incumbent CEO stockholding2 0.0014 -0.0008 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) 
ln(1 + Other incumbent directors 
stockholding) 0.0091 -0.2426*** 
 (0.0644) (0.0747) 
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Table 13 continued 
Frustrating action and incumbent CEO turnover after hostile takeover bids: Effect of treating the type of bid 
resistance as being exogenous 
Bid and target characteristics 
Probability of incumbent CEO 
turnover Probability of frustrating action 
(1) (2) 
Independent incumbent 
chairperson 0.1217 -0.2404*** 
 (0.0750) (0.0636) 
Incumbent board size 0.0633*** -0.0803*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0282) 
Initial would-be acquirer with 
interlocking/siding incumbent 
director 0.0429 -0.3022*** 
 (0.1358) (0.0772) 
Target outside blockholdings -0.0041* -0.0093*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) 
Post-Cadbury  0.5636*** 
  (0.0443) 
Constant 0.4573*** 0.4387*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0262) 
Controls for four target industries Yes Yes 
Controls for bid announcement 
years No No 
Chi2 test for model significance 66.63*** 552.28*** 
Pseudo R2 statistic for model fit   57.55 
Chi2 test for effect of treating the 
type of bid resistance as being 
exogenous 0.79  
Observations 119 119 
 
